The Kurds:
One People -Four States - What
Kind of Future?
26 May 2004
Folketinget (Danish Parliamen
A conference organised by DKR, Danish-Kurdish
council for Human Rights
E-mail to danskkurdiskraad@yahoo.dk
Address: Chairman Lars Kramer Mikkelsen,
MP,
Folketinget, Christiansborg 1240
KBH.K - Denmark
Danish-Kurdish Council for Human
Rights
E-mail to danskkurdiskraad@yahoo.dk
The conference was supported
by Nævnet vedrørende EU-Oplysning
Introduction
by chairman of the DKR, MP Lars
Kramer Mikkelsen
It’s a great pleasure for me to extend
the most heartfelt welcome to all participants to this conference.
For some years we have felt a great
need to focus public attention to the most important questions of the human
rights of the Kurdish populations, generally and more specially in the
four countries in the Middle East and in Turkey, where most Kurds are residing.
Some events over the last few years
have served to highlight the developments.
The war against the Saddam regime,
which led to the removal of the dictator, is one important fact.
I am not going to comment on the
international aspects of this war, but it is evident that to the Kurds
of Iraq the removal led to many new developments, which for the greater
part I think have been positive, especially for the Kurds.
Also for Turkey, the question of
human rights of minorities is playing an important role, and of course
the Kurdish people in Turkey form a very important minority. In the quest
for Turkish membership in the European Union, the so-called Copenhagen
criteria play and will continue to play a very important role. This point
of view applies both to the European Commission and to the member countries
of the European Union towards the decision on a date for the commencement
of negotiations between the Union and Turkey on membership.
I must admit that I myself attach
great weight to the position of human rights in Turkey, both as a member
of the DKR, and as one of the Danish members of the Council of Europe.
A lot of the necessary legislation seems to be coming into place, but we
must also emphasize the necessity of looking into the actual implementation
of the legislation, in the military, in the prisons, and in the police
stations.
These important developments will
not make us forget the importance of the human rights positions in Iran
and in Syria. I dare say to the contrary.
Of course, it is important to focus
even more on the developments in these two countries, as we proceed.
Let me end this address by expressing
a special welcome to the Kurdish representatives here present, and allow
me also a special welcome to the former Danish Foreign Minister Mogens
Lykketoft, who will introduce the conference.
Contents
The greatest people in the world
without a state.
Opening speech by Mr. Mogens Lykketoft,
former Foreign Minister of Denmark
on the Kurdish affairs in Iraq,
Iran, Turkey and Syria…………………………………………….. 5-65
What future for the Kurds?
Report to the Conference
Khaled Salih, University of Southern
Denmark ……………………………………………………….. 7-19
NORTHERN KURDISTAN (TURKEY) …………………………………………………………………….
20-38
Current Situation in Turkey in Relation
to the Kurdish Problem
By Bayram Bozyel,
Writer, journalist and Deputy Chairman
of HAK-PAR. Turkey ………………………………… 21-27
The Commission of the EU should lay
down a Schedule for the Fulfilment
of the Demands and for Co-operation
with Kurdish Representatives
By Keya Izol, Kurdish Platform in
Europe
(Representative of political organisations,
NGOs and individuals - Turkey) ………….… 28-30
Report of the Kurdistan Socialist
Party on the political developments in Turkey;
Turkey with its current status,
does not deserve to become a member
of the EU………………………………………….. 31-38
SOUTHERN KURDISTAN (IRAQ) ...............................................................
39-45
The Kurds have for long been an
important driving force
By Taha Barwary, Representative
for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG)
in the Nordic Countries ……………………………………………………………………………………………..
40-41
We are on the right track, but it
takes time
Intervention on behalf of the Regional
Government of Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah
by Minister of Culture Mr. Fattah
Khalil Fattah ……………………………………………….……… 42-43
Faylee-Kurds: An Issue of Re-Thinking
Dr. Akram Hawas, Representing the
Faylee Kurds' General Council ……………………... 44-45
SOUTH-WESTERN KURDISTAN (SYRIA)………………………………………………………….…
46-63
The Kurds in Syria: Spread Democracy
to enable our Kurdish people
to get its legitimate national rights
By Ahmad Mahmoud Cheto, Yekiti-Demokrat,
Syria …………………………………………..… 47-52
North of the “smaller” homeland,
Syria: The dangerous peripheral
geography game; The Kurdish issue
between strategy and tactics
By Fateh Mohammad Jamous, Human
Rights champion – Syria ……………………….… 53-60
The Reality of the Kurdish Situation
in Syria
By Abdulbaset Sieda, Writer …………………………………………………………………………………...
61-63
EASTERN KURDISTAN (IRAN) ..................................................................
64-68
Iranian Kurdistan from a Closed
Gate to a Brighter Future
By Abdoulmajid Hakki, Repr. of the
Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan …………. 65-66
A Brief View on Human Rights; Situation
in Iranian Kurdistan
By Jahanbakhs Khaledi, Kurdistan
Peace Committee ……………………………………………… 67-68
The greatest people in the world
without a state.
Opening speech by Mr. Mogens
Lykketoft, former Foreign Minister of
Denmark on the Kurdish affairs
in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria.
Dear Friends.
It gives me great pleasure to have
been invited here today.
The Kurdish people are close friends
of Denmark. We share the same aspirations for
a peaceful future and the extension
of democracy and human rights, both in the Middle East and in the rest
of the world.
We are as peoples tied together by
our common geopolitical interests, but also specifically by many years’
of peaceful and friendly co-existence here in Denmark.
To me, you, the Kurdish people, may
be the best proof of the ability to survive culturally of peoples.
You are, with your 30 million people,
the greatest people in the world without a state.
But, at the same time, you are,
as we are gathered here today, the proof of the strength and perseverance
of your identity as ethnic Kurds.
The 2500 years of history of the
Kurdish people as subjects of foreign regimes in Mesopotamia prove the
indomitable nature of Kurdish culture.
You show us that while the nation
state as a term today is changing, the culture of the peoples is a constant,
something common for mankind.
And this is the very reason – because
cultural community is a fundamental part of our lives as humans – why we
should protect the right to enjoy each our own culture, each history and
each our language.
This is the reason why it is an infringement
of the human rights when Kurds are denied
the use of their mother tongue.
It is an infringement when you are denied the pursuit of your culture.
No matter whether it happens in Turkey, in Iraq, in Iran – or in Syria.
It is a crime, when Kurds are banished
from villages in Eastern Turkey. It is a crime against humanity when Kurds
through the ages have been the victims of genocide and persecution. And
there is no excuse for these crimes. Only condemnation.
It is important for the Social Democrats
that we together develop the world in a direction
where it is the power of justice
that prevails, and not the justice of the power.
For too many years the Kurds of Turkey
have experienced the weakness of international law, if the states do not
fulfil their obligations. This is proved by the hundreds of cases brought
against the Turkish state. By you at the European Court of Justice. International
law obliges states to abide with it.
We work for more democracy, greater
protection of the human rights, and better legal systems. This should apply
not only in the states of the world, but also between the
states.
We very well understand the joy of
the Kurds that Saddam, the tyrant, is gone.
But the Social Democrats opposed
that Denmark and the Coalition willingly went to war against Iraq. We believe
it was a step in the wrong direction to bypass the United Nations. We believe
that the weapons inspectors should have been given time to finish their
work.
We believed before the beginning
of the war that there was reason to doubt the arguments produced by the
coalition. The doubt was later shown to be fully justified.
And first of all we feared that there
was no plan to win peace, when the war was won. Until now we have been
sadly confirmed in this doubt.
The Social Democrats believe that
what the world needs is for us to maintain the democratic principles –
also globally – and not just to leave leadership to the country that at
any time possesses the greatest military capacity.
This is decisive for us to build
a common future not only with peace, but also with tolerance and decent
co-existence.
The fundamentals of the way of Social
Democratic thinking are freedom, equality, and solidarity.
Freedom to live a decent life with
political, cultural and social rights. And freedom for each and everybody
to achieve the best framework to express our unique potentials.
Equality between peoples, between
cultures, between ethnic groups, between people no matter their origin,
political orientation, religion or sex. Equality because all men are equally
valuable to their society, and because our society is the sum of all what
we together contribute to it.
And solidarity because we believe
that those with a surplus have a human obligation to help those without.
Because we believe that with a common effort we can improve the terms of
the weak in our own society and outside it. Solidarity, because we refuse
to accept violations of the human rights of the Kurdish people and for
other oppressed peoples all over the world.
We know that changes are possible,
if we are many. If we really believe in it, and if all forces are put to
use
What future for the Kurds?
Report to the Conference
‘The Kurds: One People - Four
States - What kind of future?’
Khaled Salih,
University of Southern Denmark
Introduction
It is a courageous decision to organise
a conference with the title ‘The Kurds: One People - Four States - What
kind of future?’ even though the title only asserts the fact that the Kurds
as a people are divided between four states and asks an intellectual and
policy-oriented question about possible future prospects. In a democratic
society this can be done without violent clashes between groups, political
parties or involvement of security forces preventing organisation of such
a conference. In the Middle East (or West Asia to which Turkey also belongs)
this would have been a different story. Such an event would most certainly
be viewed as an ‘illegal act’, ‘instigation of hatred’, outright threat
to the ‘indivisibility of the state and the nation’, or a direct challenge
to the Islamic conception of political order. If held outside of the region,
individuals who participate in such a conference might face serious problems,
upon their return if they were citizens of those states where the Kurds
live, or when they travel to the region if they happen to be citizens of
other states. It is in this context that the initiative is courageous in
moral, political, intellectual and civil senses of the word ('Courage'
2004), not least because in the political world few concepts are so controversial
as ‘people’, despite the fact that Article 1 of The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights states that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
It is not a secret that deciding
‘who is a people’ in the contemporary world is a political question rather
than a legal process, a subjective self-identification or historically
based assertions. In the international political system only those who
have attained, or were granted, state sovereignty are regarded as peoples.
In fact few peoples have been allowed freely to determine their political
status (the most recent exception being the people of East Timor).
Though the UN Charter is written
in the name of ‘We the Peoples of United Nations’ the organisation represents
only the existing sovereign states, not the peoples or the nations that
inhabit our world, as its name misleadingly indicates. However, given the
level of political violence that eventually led to the creation of the
UN and the brutality of interstate and civil wars of the past decades,
it is not difficult to agree with Kofi Annan's proposition that the expression
‘we the peoples’ should be seen as reaffirming ‘the dignity and worth of
the human person, respect for human rights and the equal rights of men
and women, and a commitment to social progress as measured by better standards
of life, in freedom from want and fear alike. Ultimately, then, the United
Nations exists for, and must serve, the needs and hopes of people everywhere.’
(Annan 2002, 6)
If the UN is to serve the needs and
hopes of people everywhere, if ‘everywhere’ is also to include the Middle
East/West Asia and if the self-identification of the Kurds as a people
is to be respected, Annan's challenge to critically shift the thinking
of the UN as the world organisation should be the guiding principle of
this conference on the Kurds. As he eloquently urged the UN:
[W]e must put people at the centre
of everything we do. No calling is more noble, and no responsibility greater,
than that of enabling men, women and children, in cities and
villages around the world, to make
their lives better.’ (Annan 2002, 7)
Enabling Kurdish women, men and children
to develop better standards of life and live in freedom from want and fear
alike would be a noble and great responsibility for those who desire to
engage in facilitating a better future in the entire Middle East/Wes Asia.
Compared with other peoples in the region, the Kurds have not been on equal
footing in term of standards of life, including freedom from want and fear,
since the creation of the modern states at the beginning of 1920s (with
the sole exception of the Kurds in Iraq since 1992).
The Kurds are regarded either as
‘pariah minority’ (Rubin 2003), or seen, in a blaming the- victim-reasoning,
as a source of destabilisation. A book advertisement in 1994 asserted that
with ‘20-30 million people divided between four rival countries in the
Middle East, the Kurds have long been a destabilising factor in a mountainous
region which is rich in water, oil and minerals.’ (UGI 1994) However, being
regarded as a ‘pariah minority’ or a ‘destabilising factor’ are not entirely
irrelevant concepts to understand how the Kurds were, and still are, dealt
with politically in the past seven or eight decades. These concepts and
perspectives determine the policies and strategies of the elites of the
modern, but highly centralised, states, including those of the Middle East/West
Asia.
Past Strategies
When the empires of the Middle East/West
Asia were replaced by modern centralising territorial states (often misleadingly
called nation-states) at the beginning of 1920s, the Kurds were left without
a state of their own. In the new constellations, they became minorities
in new political inventions and constructions dominated by ideologies of
Turkish, Persian and (two versions of) Arab nationalisms. The imposition
of this new state system with its new ideological drive for centralisation,
homogenisation and control created entirely different conditions for the
stateless Kurds. This was a dramatic shift from several hundred years of
imperial tradition in which the Kurdish territory had no sharp mined and
military guarded borders. The Kurds, likes most of other groups in the
vast Ottoman and Persian empires, were subject to ‘remote’ and discontinuous
impe-
rial control, carried out ‘cross-border’
activities, could easily manipulate and adjust to the loose imperial networks
for their own benefits and intermittingly enjoy a relative degree of local
autonomy. The new state system did not only lead to the imposition of radically
different administrative and security control systems, but also to the
introduction of new political ideologies. The new state ideologies envisaged
their societies in radically different ways, with radical future projections.
Demands of minority nationalisms for representation, power-sharing or mere
survival were regarded as ‘illegitimate’, backwardness or just fifth column
proxies. The trajectories of the modern states in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and
Syria were the basic frameworks with which one can analyse and understand
these states’ policies and strategies vis-à-vis the Kurdish populations
in each state. Since the aim of this conference is to focus on future policy
prospects in relation to the Kurds, only a brief account of the state strategies
to deal with the Kurds will be presented.
A most common strategy exploited
by the four states in which the Kurds are formal citizens is the official
denial of Kurdistan as a territory on its terms. Although various governments
in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have chosen different approaches in their
denial or partial recognition of the existence of the Kurds as a people
with legitimate political, social and security demands, a persistent denial
of a greater Kurdistan and attempts to prevent an eventual emergence of
such an entity has been linked to the national security of these states.
Consequently, the Kurds have been deprived of any meaningful opportunity
to discuss various conceptions and imaginations of Kurdistan, including
possibly peaceful arrangements. More than often Kurdish demands were interpreted
as a direct challenge to the new state elites’ authority, legitimacy or
demand for ‘national’ cohesion (which in practice meant assimilation).
The Kurds were viewed as a major obstacle to the ways the new elites thought
their societies ought to be rather than to deal with how it is constituted.
Since Kurdish political demands to shared power and resources between different
political groups and their very idea that the societies
in question do not need to be homogenous
but rather heterogeneous, multi-national, -ethnic and –religious,
they easily became targets of security, military and political campaigns,
all in the name of ‘national’ security, territorial integrity and state
sovereignty. Usually these kinds of internationally recognisable justifications
have functioned as effective methods to ward off even mild international
criticisms.
While the existence of a Kurdistan
province is officially acknowledged in Iran, it amounts only to one-eighth
of the Kurdish area in that country (Rubin 2003, 296). In Iraq the 1958
provisional constitution recognised the existence of the Kurdish nationality
alongside the Arabs, but the establishment of a Kurdistan Autonomous Region
in 1974 did not satisfied the expectations of the Kurds and led let to
another wave of military confrontation between the Baptist government of
the time and the Kurds. Until recently, denial of the existence of the
Kurds and the Kurdish language in the Turkish Republic was a ritual secular
prayer, repeated by politicians, military, security and civil bureaucracies,
as well as media and ordinary citizens. In Syria, the Kurds are still treated
as ‘guests’ without political, legal and social rights. Military solutions
have been the first option to which state elites in Turkey, Iran, Iraq
and Syria have devoted themselves and their country’s resources. While
Iraq’s military offensives against the Kurds are more known to the outside
world, the Turkish military ‘found control of Kurdistan to be its prime
function and reason d’être. Only one out of 18 Turkish military engagements
during the years 1924-38 occurred outside Kurdistan. After 1945, apart
from the Korean war, 1949-52 and the invasion of Cyprus, 1974, the only
Turkish army operations continued to be against the Kurds’ (McDowall 2000,
198)
Generally speaking the state elites
in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have combined elements of strategies of
elimination and
management in the past?. In addition
to the denial of the existence of the Kurds, Kurdish language and Kurdistan
and partial recognition, genocidal campaigns, mass deporta-
tion and expulsion, political homogenisation
and assimilation, coercive administrative and security control
systems and shallow autonomy arrangements have been recognisable methods
exploited by successive governments in dealing with the Kurds. The result
is massive internal displacement, destruction of villages and small towns,
militarization of states and societies, repression of political parties
and undermining of civil society organisations, to name but few long-term
consequences. These states share important characteristic traits of what
political scientists call state failure, not least because of the enduring
character and the direction of the violence against the Kurds?. Failed
states generally do not deliver positive political goods to their peoples;
they are often tense, deeply conflicted, hard and fierce in dealing with
alternative versions of reality, and bitterly contested constructions.
In order to avoid questioning the legitimacy of their monolithic world
views, they embark on violent military expeditions to avoid dialogue, revision
of flawed political orders and profound reform programmes.
Undoubtedly, violent methods dominated
the ways in which the state elites tried to solve
political, social and economic differences
in their respective parts of Kurdistan. But violence is not the only way
with which modern states have sought conflict resolutions, and the states
in the Middle East/West Asia are not destined to pursue only one and the
same path. New circumstances, elite reconsiderations of past strategies,
new international insights, as well as international changes and incentives
can and should change past commitments. New opportunities will require
new decisions, new strategies and commitments. Given several decades of
past failures and the emergence of new opportunities, one can expect different
and constructive policy options and strategic decision to be taken. Failed
states generally do not deliver positive political goods to their peoples;
they are often tense, deeply conflicted, hard and violent military expeditions
------
1 For a general discussion on state
strategies see O’Leary 2001.
2 For a comprehensive discussion
and documentation on state failure see Goldstone, Gurr, et al, 2000.to
avoid dialogue, revision of flawed political orders and profound reform
programmes.
Future prospects
In a world full of ethnocentrism,
prejudice, and violent conflict, there is a vital need for core democratic
values to resolve ethnic and religious conflicts and to prevent their escalation
to violence. The absence of democratic mechanisms to sort out conflicts
within a country often makes it easy for conflicts to spill over into violence.
(Hamburg 1995)
Lack of proper democratic political
processes and the absence of liberalism in the Middle
East/West Asia might be seen as
one of the main causes of the high level of political violence in solving
political issues. However, no country or region in the world should be
seen as to have taken non-reversal paths. South Africa abolished Apartheid
(and indeed managed to construct new democratic institutions and an inclusive
civic culture, leaving behind decades of statutory racism and ideological
division). Some former communist countries in Eastern Europe have joined
the European Union, partly because they abolished the former political
systems and party because they managed to establish new political orders
qualifying their countries to EU membership. Several countries torn apart
by civil wars have signed new political and social pacts. Although most
transitions to radically different political orders are far from smooth,
envisaging a better future for the inhabitants of these countries have
helped to embark on new future political projects.
Available and viable alternatives,
serious exploration of their feasibility and qualified discussions on their
wisdom and efficacy in the light of reasonable projections of what might
happen are not an academic luxury, but necessary demands in democratising
societies. Imagining better future scenarios would facilitate meaningful
meetings, constructive dialogues and hopes for shared
futures of inclusive, representative,
accountable and dynamic political systems based on official recognition
of existing diversities of the societies in question.
Due to different relationship between
the dominant groups and the Kurds, it is possible to imagine and discuss
diverse future options in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The state constructions,
recent evolution of their political systems, emerging new elite constellations,
specific regional dynamics and their relationship to the outside world
would no doubt lay ground for distinct future prospects. Despite that the
political elites of all four states stand, though in fundamentally different
ways, in front of decisive moments of choices about the future of peoples
they ostensibly represent or control. If they opt to distance themselves
from the tyranny of the past, they can actively influence, if not direct,
the forces of change that take social, political, religious and regional
diversities as a source of strength to create better standards of life
and conditions to live in freedom from want and fear for every individual
and people that must live together. There are at least two great opportunities
(in Turkey and Iraq) and two future possibilities (in Iran and Syria) by
which the future of the Kurds will directly be determined.
Turkey: United in diversity, at home
and as EU member?
Turkey has already booked its place
in Europe.
(Solana 2002)
Compared to Iran, Iraq and Syria,
Turkey has developed a wide-range of democratic political institutions
and mechanisms, as well as long-standing relationship with the European
Union and other Western democratic organisations that together should make
the country more amenable to democratic dialogue and exchanges of ideas.
Turkey’s application for EU membership provides a unique opportunity to
carry out profound systemic reform and successively mark a definitive departure
from previous monolithic beliefs in and practice of homogenisation and
military solutions for the Kurdish issue, not least because Article Two
of the first draft of the Union’s
constitution demand specific values from the member states.
The Union is founded on the values
of respect for human dignity, lib-
erty, democracy, equality, the rule
of law and respect for human rights. Theses values are common to the Member
States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination.
This is strengthened by the first
paragraph of Article Three in which the aim of Union is ‘to promote peace,
its values and the well-being of its peoples.’ (European Convention 2003)
Those European countries that laid the ground work for the evolution of
the EEC, the EC and later developed and expanded as the EU have dramatically
shifted their focus from state security to the security of their populations
and peoples. They have gradually developed from what political scientists
label as electoral democracies to liberal democracies, with constitutional
guaranties for human rights, women’s rights and the rights of minorities.
Eastern European countries who aspired to join the Union must ideologically,
politically, socially, economically and administratively be able to advocate
and live up to these European values. At the same time these values must
be implemented throughout the country for the benefits of all citizens
and peoples.
In the negotiation process to qualify
for membership, Turkey needs to change its dominant political thinking,
the current constitution and thousands of laws and regulations before it
can be described as a society characterised by pluralism, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and non-discrimination. The past cannot simply be wished away.
The future cannot be achieved by imprecise changes. The ultimate test of
willingness to direct the state and society in Turkey towards a new future
will be determined by the government’s capacity and capability to implement
essential reforms throughout the country without prejudice and discrimination
on the basis of historical suspicion and blaming-the-victim reasoning.
But, to be sure, Turkey has already embarked on a major reform programme
and it can hardly retreat from it.
On its way the country will need
extensive assistance, expertise, financial support, and political encouragement.
The European Union has already committed itself to this process and required
financial needs. The current Turkish government has promised, and occasionally
taken, further steps in the right direction. It has taken courageous steps
‘in face of strong resistance’ (Oostlander 2004) from the military and
those elite groups whose positions and interests are not served by a deepening
and widening process of democratisation. For the root of the problem lies
in the fact that Turkey, despite the determination of its government, cannot
meet the Copenhagen political criteria under present circumstances. Because,
as a recent report from the European Parliament noticed, the country has
not yet established a clear framework for guaranteeing political, civil,
economic, social and cultural rights. In order to meet these criteria,
more far-reaching efforts are required from Turkey ‘to enhance the coherence
of legal provisions and practice, which will underline the drastic and
fundamental character of the transformation of Turkey towards membership’
(Oostlander 2004, 6). The point is that ‘reparation and amendments’ will
not do the trick despite significant changes introduced as part of the
packages of political reform, because Turkey has not managed to circumvent
its ‘Constitution adopted in 1982 during the military regime, reflecting
a largely authoritarian philosophy’ (Oostlander, 5-6). Like the new members
of the European Union, Turkey needs to adopt a new constitution, signalling
beyond doubt that such a step is a point of departure for the process of
reform and modernisation of the state and society (Oostlander 2004, 6).
This is a necessary step in a serious of revolutionary reforms which can
only be judged ‘on the basis of their actual implementation in terms of
day-to-day practice at all levels of the judicial and security system and
of both the civilian and military administration, and that they must have
the support of society’, a long process for which Turkey will need both
fundamental decisions and continued European aid (Oostlander 2004, 6).
As Javier Solana so eloquently has expressed, Turkey has already booked
its place in Europe; the reservation of that seat in December 1999 was
unanimously supported by the 15 EU heads of state and government of the
time. But in the process it is up to Turkey if the country ‘wishes to assume
its place in Europe’ (Solana 2002).
It is in this complex process of
necessary democratisation of Turkey through the accession process and negotiation,
Turkey’s Kurdish policies and strategies must be redefined and re-framed
within a new emerging political system with appropriate institutional arrangements.
The Turkish problem with the Kurds cannot be painted over or brushed away.
Provided that Turkey, partly due to internal mechanisms and processes,
and partly because of the country’s willingness to become a full member
in the EU, will not relapse into military coups (as in 1960, 1971 and 1980)
or coup attempts (as in 1997), and provide that Turkey continues its development
towards a liberal democratic polity as a pre-condition for its negotiation
and eventual membership in the EU, almost every reform might contribute
to create a better ground to re-define, re-formulate and implement different
policies and strategies regarding the Kurds in Turkey. In this process,
official recognition of diversity and differences and negotiations to the
ensuing tensions and conflicts out to, if not must, become the basic political
philosophy and process (Baumeister 2000). After all, the EU enlargement
ceremonies of 1st May 2004 were carried out under the banner of ‘United
in Diversity’, as a result of more than a decade of negotiations with the
new member states. This is based on the liberal idea of value pluralism
for which a set of institutions must be developed in order to effectively
manage the conflict and antagonism that inevitably accompanies diversity
(Baumeister 2000).
Theoretically, intellectually and
politically, there are several options for decision-makers, strategists
and supporters of peaceful resolutions of Turkish policy vis-à-vis the
Kurds. Here few institutional arrangements will be mentioned briefly.
One possibility is a combination
of democratisation and decentralisation in which the unitary nature of
the Turkish state will remain as the main characteristics. In this context
an administrative decentralisation will devolve powers to administrative
units
without recognising group identities.
Several arguments might be used to support such an arrangement: the centralist
tradition of the Turkish state (and its Ottoman predecessor), French Jacobin
model and the fear of breaking up of Turkey. But evidence of genuinely
democratising countries that are linked to the EU mechanisms of regional
co-operations will undermine such reasoning. Spain and Greece provide two
good examples against traditional resistance to reforms and democratisation
by exploiting fear and shallow arguments.
A second arrangement might combine
democratisation and decentralisation with group recognition. Loyalty to
the state and its institutions would be based on the notion of democratic
citizenship in which shared interests, values and necessity would not only
keep the state and its institutions together, but strengthen the ties and
links for the benefit of all groups in Turkey. References to historical
traditions of recognition in the Middle East and the Ottoman past can serve
the purpose, as well as contemporary European models, such as different
arrangements in the UK to meet demands from Scottish, Welsh and Irish nationalisms.
A third possibility for Turkey is
to look closely into the Spanish constitutional revolution of 1978. Post-Franco
Spain has become increasingly federal in arrangement, except in name. Post-Franco
politicians have recognised the need to integrate democracy and decentralisation
with recognition of historical nationalities. The 1978 Spanish constitution
has created a decentralised, democratic political order in Spain which
political scientists characterise as ‘a plurinational and multilingual
state’ (Agranoff and Gallarin 1997). The most interesting element of the
Spanish development is the recognition of the need to build self-government
into the fabric of the post-Franco polity by recognising the unity of the
nation (or more appropriately the state) and the right to autonomy of nationalities
and regions. The right to self-government of municipalities, provinces
and autonomous communities has in fact strengthened both democracy and
stability in Spain through a mechanism and process of differentiation of
the country’s previous unitary state structure. More than two decades of
negotiations and agreements have reinforced self-government and power-sharing
with the regions, thereby adopting specific federal arrangements through
its autonomous states (Estado de las Autonomias). Local and regional units’
rights to make decisions independent of central government supervision
and control has contributed to a deepening and widening of constitutional
democracy in Spain, contrary to any French or Turkish Jacobinist centralisation
argument (Encarnacion 2001/2002).
Democratic consolidation in Spain
was a direct result of reconstruction of the state structure and its political
system. The political redistribution of power (between Madrid and 17 autonomous
regions - three historic autonomous regions, one specific statute autonomous
community, 12 ordinary autonomous regions and one federal capital region)
has given the three historic nationalities in the Basque country, Catalonia
and Galicia their own statute of autonomy tailored to their particular
situation based on specific compromises negotiated between the government
in Madrid and the regional leaderships. In each case, the ‘central’ government
and the autonomous regions each have a range of exclusive powers but also
function jointly in several spheres.
A fourth model that could function
as a good example of restructuring the political system is the development
in Belgium. Although this model might be regarded as too radical a departure
from the Turkish unitary state tradition with a strong distaste for multiple
identities and loyalties and with no tradition in negotiating the political
order, no rational arguments and peaceful developments can prevent considering
it as a possibility. The Belgium federation (since 1993) is based on three
territorially defined regions (Flemish Region, Brussels-Capital Region
and Walloon (French) Region, and three non-territorial language-based communities
(Flemish Community, French Community and German speaking Community). Distribution
of exclusive powers is between the federal government and two other kinds
of governments:
while the three territorially delineated
governments are mainly responsible for regional economic matters, the three
non-territorial communities mainly responsible for linguistic and cultural
matters.
Turkey’s Kurdish policy could shift
from the domain of exceptionality to the domain of normal politics if elements
of the UK, Spanish or Belgian systems were to be incorporated into the
restructured and reformed political system in Turkey, rather than obstinately
keep it within non-compromising national security discussions and military
solutions. Nothing would prevent the decision-makers in Turkey to invest
in a constructive way the potential of the country’s peoples in a strongly
restructured political system based on consensus, inclusiveness, recognition
of societal and political diversity, value pluralism, finding new mechanisms
and institutions for peaceful conflict resolutions, and other constructive
steps. Under liberal democratic conditions this could be achieved without
overtly opting for federalisation of the country. On its way to such ‘a
society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination’,
like other members of the European Union, Turkey is required to implement
all reforms that would qualify the country to a membership negotiation.
If the reform process is accelerated in ways most Easter European countries
did for more than a decade a go, a prediction by president Chirac's does
not need to come true.
Just two days before the largest
enlargement ceremonies of 1st May 2004,
President Chirac rhetorically asked:
‘Is Turkey’s entry possible today? I say “No”’. He believed that Turkey
could become a member of the Union in the perspective of 10 to 15 years
and added that ‘my conviction is that it is in the long term’ (Georges-Picot
2004). Only Turkish decision-makers have the capacity and capability to
disappoint president Chirac and those who believe that Turkey cannot fulfil
its obligations. Erdogan, Turkish Prime Minister, observed that his country
still has a lot to do, but his government would ‘continue to fulfil our
responsibilities’ to qualify for membership in the European Union.
‘We trust ourselves to pass this
test honourably’, he said, while he warned that ‘it would not only disappoint
the Turkish people, it would seriously damage the basic philosophy of the
union’ because the union is based on ‘humanitarian values’. Erdogan believed
that to delay Turkey’s membership further would be ‘wrong and unjust’ (Boland
2004). Exactly the same arguments would be used by the critics of Turkey
for the delay in what the Oostlander report call revolutionary, but essential
reforms. The sooner these reforms are carried out the better chance will
Turkey have to cross the threshold from electoral democracy to liberal
democracy. At that juncture European zone of stability and prosperity will
also peacefully be extended to Turkey, the way it did to former communist
countries in Eastern Europe. Having managed to shift mentally, institutionally
and constitutionally from a monolithic world view of assimilation, homogenisation
and violent military solutions for the Kurdish issue, Turkey’s membership
in the EU would no doubt transform the fate of the Kurds in Turkey in a
dramatically positive way. By that time, the Kurds in Iraq will be new
neighbours of the European Union in a federal and democratic Iraq.
Iraq: From mass killings and genocide
to federation?
The genocidal regime of Saddam Hussein
created justifiable arguments for entire reconstruction the state Iraq.
This complex process started shortly after the Bush administration removed
Saddam Hussein’s regime from power in April 2003. Whatever our opinion
on the events and its consequences, Iraq’s different national, ethnic,
and religious groups have now initiated a constitutional and institutional
process to re-define, negotiate and re-shape the nature of the state, the
division of powers and the country’s collective identity. A new Iraq would
federalise on the bases of a legal text called Transitional Administrative
Law (TAL, signed by Iraq’s Governing Council on 8th March 2004). If implemented
successfully, this will lead to the creation of the first case of a negotiated
state reconstruction in the Middle East/West Asia. What is crucial in this
context from a Kurdish perspective can be summarised as in the following.
1. With the removal of the Ba‘athist
regime in Iraq, a political system based on several decades of political
brutality, genocide, mass killings and mass graves, systematic oppression
and repression has come to an end. A new era of state reconstruction has
started with the signing of the TAL. Despite many short-comings and non
-democratic nature of the processes that led to signing of the document,
the TAL has created a new ground for political negotiation in Iraq. It
is the first time since Iraq’s creation as a modern state, representatives
of various groups, political parties and ideologies held meaningful negotiations
and managed to agree on a political structure that corresponds to the reality
of the country.
2. The idea of transforming Iraq
from a centralised, discriminating, genocide-prone and Sunni Arab dominated
state to a federalising construction has been one of the strongest Kurdish
demands since 1992. Federalism became a pre-condition and a pre-constitutional
principle that was cemented by the Kurds, both before the fall of Saddam
Hussein’s regime and during the short period of the negotiations that produced
the TAL. If the political forces in Iraq manage to federalise Iraq in a
meaningful way, it will lead to new mechanisms and institutions for redistribution
of power according to a new political formula in which the Kurds will be
key power sharers.
The mere acceptance of this idea
in a region with no tradition of negotiation, especially in comparison
with the Arab
states, is in itself path breaking.
The TAL recognises the existence of Kurdistan Region, despite the uncertainties
regarding border establishments and the final status of the region in the
permanent constitution. TAL also recognises the institutions and their
capacities the Kurds have developed since 1992, such as the Kurdistan National
Assembly and Kurdistan Regional Government. The articles that guarantee
individual human rights, including women’s rights are important achievements
in a country where mass graves, summary executions and disappearances were
widespread practices for which the Kurds were the prime victims throughout
most of Iraq’s modern history. The agreement that police and internal security
in Kurdistan will be within the competence of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) is a crucial achievement, both due to past genocidal policies of
the Ba’athist regime and due to fact that the control of police and security
forces by the KRG will provide some assurance for a civilian population
that cannot trust any Iraqi armed forces in a near future. The police and
security forces would also function as an early warning system for internal
border security vis-à-vis Iran, Turkey and Syria because these countries
are ideologically tempted to undermine institutional consolidations in
Kurdistan. Another positive element in the TAL is the decision to confine
any future army in Iraq only to external security under strong civilian
control. One of the most controversial paragraphs of the TAL, from the
point of view of Arab centralisers, non-democratic and anti-
Kurdish neighbours, as well as anti-federal
forces in Iraq and the region, was the idea, and what eventually became
an article in the TAL, of ratification process of the final constitution.
This gives the Kurds, but also any other people or region with a two-third
majority in three governorates, to reject an undesired draft constitution.
The compromise to see Islam only as one source of legal inspiration could
save the Kurds from becoming subjects of a new and feared form of domination,
this time by the Shi‘a majority using Islam as a new tool in the political
game. The minority rights specified in the TAL would strengthen the democratic
experience in Kurdistan because it will put Kurdistan on higher standards
regarding minority rights and protections, thereby also making possible
to demand protection for Kurds who live outside the Kurdistan region, such
as in Baghdad and other areas. The language rights guaranteed by the TAL
will for the first time strengthen the Kurds in a federal Iraq, both by
making Kurdish a second official language and providing for Kurdish to
be used extensively in the Kurdistan Region. Despite all its short-comings,
the TAL has provided a provided necessary condition for Iraq to develop
a plurinational, religiously tolerant and democratic federation. This desired
and hopeful outcome can hardly be achieved easily without meeting many
favourable and necessary conditions.
3. Though there are reasons to hope
that the promises made in the TAL mentioned above other issue would strengthen
a voluntary federal Iraq if the question of Kirkuk and other Arabised areas
can be solved in a peaceful way, if Kurdistan’s taxing capacities can finance
expected welfare programmes, if the electoral system is based on proportional
representation in which the Kurds will gain their share of posts and positions,
if shared commerce power is beneficial for Kurdistan region, if the presidential
council or the prime minister post is allocated to a Kurdish representative,
if the interim government from 1 July 2004 to 31 January 2005 manage to
set up appropriate mechanisms and a processes for the election of the National
Assembly, etc.
4. Despite these positive elements
in the emerging political development in Iraq toward a voluntary federation,
the TAL warrant several reservations. Conflicts regarding natural resources
might arise in due time because of the unclear language in the TAL. To
create a meaningful federal system, the question of the second chamber
(for regional representation) is not mentioned at all. It has to
be solved in ways accepted by the main constituent peoples of the country.
This might lead to deadlocks during the negotiations for a permanent constitution.
The question of Kurdish representation
in the presidential council and the council of ministries, including the
position of the prime minister, might lead to tension between the Kurds
and other groups in a future government if no clear mechanisms are found
in time. The KRG might face conflicting interpretations on the question
of its authority over border controls in areas under KRG. The final status
of Kirkuk might turn out to be much more problematic difficult to solve
than anticipated, particularly if outside powers manage to manipulate different
groups either to serve outside interests or by undermining ongoing negotiations
at sensitive junctures. Playing the majority-game might turn out to be
a strong card in the hands of various Shi‘a politicians who might turn
out to be less popular than they imagined themselves to be. At specific
times the majority-game might be sued to undermine liberal rights and guarantees,
thereby creating confusions in relation to the role of Islam in politics
and invite outside powers in order to alter delicate internal power-balances.
Other questions might also arise due to unclear arrangements in relation
to power-sharing in the federal government. (For a fuller account see (O'Leary,
McGarry et al. 2004)
To be sure, this is only the first
crucial step in a long and complex process state reconstruction. What has
been achieved can be strengthened, deepened and consolidated. For that
to be materialised, the Kurds in Iraq in particular and the rest of Iraq
in general, need international diplomatic, political and public support.
In particular the process needs expert assistance, reconstruction aid,
diplomatic recognition and dialogue seminars, conferences, aid programmes
and a lot of good will from those who negotiate and from democratic resourceful
states, regions and organisations. Individual European Parliaments, governments,
European Union institutions and political organisations could actively
support the complex process of reconstruction and reconciliation. Many
countries in Europe have first hand experience of reconstruction from the
Second World War.
The European Union and NATO’s European
members have accumulated experience in the same field from missions in
Europe and elsewhere. Together they could provide Iraq’s different peoples
and regions with substantial assistance, building of new infrastructures,
political dialogue, etc.
The issue should be regarded as moral
and normative obligation to assist the peoples of Iraq in the post-Ba‘thist
era, in a liberation and occupation process that has become more problematic
than expected. Even if the coalition forces might not succeed in finding
evidences of weapons of mass destruction with which they justified the
war to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime, even if winning the peace in the
post-war era seems to be more difficult than anticipated, no-one should
doubt that the peoples of Iraq have been freed from a regime of mass destruction.
The peoples of Iraq deserve a better future after decades of deportations,
disappearances, mass killings, genocide, wars and sanctions. In order to
bring a democratic, parliamentary, plural, tolerant and federal political
system, the coming months and years will be vital for Iraq, its peoples,
its neighbours, but who desire and work to bring about stability of the
entire Middle East/West Asia. Success or failure in Iraq will not depend
on the peoples of Iraq, but equally on the willingness of the international
community of states to assist in time and in relation to the needs arising
from the reconstruction of the political system, healing deep wounds of
the recent past and bringing the Ba‘thist perpetrators who committed those
crimes to justice. It will be vital not to allow the democratic experience
in Kurdistan to fail, not least for the potential risks that the project
voluntary re-integration and democratisation in the rest of Iraq face unprecedented
difficulties or will be undermined. Democratic countries and organisations
should actively take a moral and normative duty to engage in strengthening
Kurdistan while the region still keeps its stability, prosperity and hope
for a brighter future. There should be no time to regret that a unique
opportunity has been lost while the possibility and needs are so obvious,
so dire and demanding.
Iran: Systematic discrimination against
the Kurds are slowly changing’
In decades the situation of the
Kurds in Iran has been very little know to the outside world, partly because
of the lack of information on the Kurds there and partly because of the
dramatic shifts in Iranian politics since 1979 and the tensions between
Iran and the West as well as self-imposed Iranian isolation until 1997
(when Khatami became president).
The major shift in the status of
the Kurds in Iran was connected to the imposition of Shi‘a Islam as the
ideological political system. This transformed the Kurds into a minority
in two senses, both a national and religious minority in a political system
dominated now by Shi‘a Persians. Since 1997 hopes and expectations have
been linked to the reformists around president Khatami who might facilitate
condition to achieve some fundamental changes in the Iranian political
system. In this process, the Kurds might seize the opportunity to improve
their conditions and thereby share some of the fruits of a reformed political
system. Many Kurds were prepared to engage in the reform process. During
the past years, the Kurds of Iran have been given some administrative responsibility,
a limited degree of cultural and language freedom as well as some favourable
conditions regarding publication of newspapers, journal and transmission
of radio and television. But these remain within the framework of what
the authorities permit and understand as to be within drawn boundaries
of Islamic politics drawn by the dominant Shi‘a Persian elite.
Until recently (Parliament election
in February 2004) a Kurdish block of legislators in the Iranian Majlis
(Parliament) were able to express some Kurdish concerns, but that hasn’t
changed the overall political orientation of Persian policies of domination
vis-à-vis the Kurds (Blua 2003).
In a near future, focusing on human
rights, national minority rights and strengthening the rule of law, as
well as de-militarising Kurdish provinces would be the most important elements
in bringing about pressure on
the Iranian government to improve
the situation of the Kurds in Iran. EU's strategy could include political
dialogue with moderate Kurdish political parties, as well as regional and
provincial aids in which the Kurdish regions can gain directly. The governor
of Kurdistan, Abdollah Ramazanzadeh was positive about Kurdistan’s potential,
because he believed that Iran’s systematic discrimination against the Kurds
are slowly changing. He believed that ‘in ten years or so, Kurdistan will
be not only a happy province, but also a prosperous one’ (Economist 2000).
Even though the region he referred to is a limited part of what is traditionally
known as Kurdistan in Iran, the process of decentralisation and devolution
would no doubt benefit the Kurds, in the same way as Iran’s attempt to
ease its tensions with the European Union, USA and the UN through different
security, trade and economic mechanisms, processes and institutional arrangements.
At one level, Iran’s social, cultural
and linguistic diversities have not been denied publicly.
The idea of having a University called
Kurdistan, as the University is called in Sanandaj, is still a political
heresy in Turkey and Syria. European organisations, Parliaments, political
parties and institutions could assist Kurdish school, scientific and cultural
projects to improve daily life of ordinary people, either through direct
relations with specific groups who run projects or through joint-programmes
covering several regions or areas. For the time being, there are on signs
of major improvements of the political system that could lead to any re-arrangement
in which power-sharing and meaningful representation of peoples of Iran
would be hallmark of the country’s political system. However, small steps
to improve daily life of Kurds and other minorities in Iran are possible
and should be supported openly. Iran is a vital country in a volatile region.
The potential of its peoples, the natural resources and the country’s geographical
situation could change the entire region in a positive direction in which
the internal reform processes can achieve its goals to re-shape the political
system and its direction.
Syria: Pressing for substantial reforms
The small size of the Kurds, the
domination of the Alawi minority government for decades, the consolidation
of the new president’s power, and Syria’s involvement in the so called
Barcelona process should together provide a good opportunity to demand
more substantial reforms in Syria. The Kurds are not, and have never been,
in a position to press for radical changes of the entire political system
alone. The Alawi minority government cannot hope to control the country’s
population for much longer without fulfilling reform expectations accelerated
by official periodical reform talks, removal of Saddam’s regime from power
in Iraq and several other factors.
The European Union, within the parameters
of the EU-Mediterranean Partnership, is well equipped to link trade relations
and sector-directed aid programmes to improvements of the human rights
situation of the Kurds. EU institutions and governments can press Syrian
government and authorities to abolish the military laws and the state of
emergency (in place since March 1963), to stop the Arabisation of the Kurds
and their region and change the status of the nearly quarter of a million
stateless Kurds who have been deprived of citizenship. Demands can also
be made to abolish many regulations prohibiting the Kurds from owning land,
legal marriages, education in Kurdish and benefiting from public health
cares (Rubin 2003). The European Union can also demand establishment of
independent and impartial judicial enquiries into clashes and reported
human rights violations, such as the ones in mid-March 2004 when Kurds
in Syria celebrated the signing of the TAL in Iraq. Equally important is
the demand by the European Union, the UN and international human rights
organisations to be allowed to investigate reports of human rights violations
on the ground. These steps are important for the credibility of the aids
given to Syria in the eyes of European citizen. They are also important
if long-term peace and stability in the Middle East/West Asia are to be
taken seriously and if the desired and official announcements of the European
Union to contribute to the improvements of the living conditions in the
countries with partnership programmes with the Union to have any credibility.
References
Agranoff, R. and J. A. R. Gallarin
(1997). ‘Toward federal democracy in Spain: An examination of intergovernmental
relations.’ Publius 27(4): 1-38.
Annan, K. (2002). 'We the Peoples'.
The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century.
New York, United Nations.
Baumeister, A. T. (2000). Liberalism
and the Politics of Differences'. Edinburgh,
Edinburgh University Press.
Blua, A. (2003). ‘Iraq: In Turkey,
Iran and Syria, Kurdish minorities watching with interest.’
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty,
at
http://www.rferl.org/features/2002/10/23102002154346.asp.
Boland, V. (2004). ‘EU “must accept
Turkey” without delay.’ Financial Times, 5 May.
‘Courage’ (2004), Social Research
71(1).
Economist (2000). ‘Iran’s Kurds:
The lucky ones?’ The Economist 357(8202): 56-57, 23
December 2000 - 5 January 2001.
Encarnacion, G. O. (2001/2002).
‘Spain after Franco: Lesson in democratization.’ World
Policy Journal 18(4): 35-44.
European Convention (2003). Draft
treaty establishing a constitution for Europe. Adopted by consensus by
the European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003. Submitted to the President
of the European Council in Rome, 18 July 2003.
Georges-Picot, E. (2004). ‘Chirac:
Turkey Not Fit for Entry into EU.’ Associated Press, 29
April.
Goldstone, J. A., T. R. Gurr, et
al. (2000). State Failure Task Force Report: Phase III
Findings, at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/stfail/
Hamburg, D. A. (1995). ‘Foreword’,
in Larry Diamond, 1995, Promoting democracy in the
1990s: Actors and instruments, issues
and imperatives (A Report to the Carnegie
Commission on Preventing Deadly
Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York).
McDowall, D. (2000). A modern history
of the Kurds. London, I.B. Tauris.
O'Leary, B., J. McGarry & K.
Salih, Eds. (2004). The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq.
Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Oostlander, A. M. (2004). Report
on the 2003 regular report of the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards
accession. European Parliament: FINAL A5-0204/2004, 19 March 2004.
Rubin, M. (2003). ‘Are Kurds a pariah
minority?’ Social Research 70(1): 295-331.
Solana, J. (2002). ‘Europe's Path
for Turkey.’ International Herald Tribune, 7 December.
UGI (1994). The Kurds: Caught between
nations. Available at http://www.globalissues.
co.uk/titles.php, UGI.
NORTHERN KURDISTAN (TURKEY)
Current Situation in Turkey in
Relation
to the Kurdish Problem
By Bayram
Bozyel,
Writer, journalist and Deputy
Chairman of HAK-PAR. Turkey
Whilst some of the reasons, which
lead to the current situations in Turkey, resulted from the coup
in 12 September 1980, rest of the reasons arise from the founding philosophy
of the Republic. As it is well known, The Ottoman Empire that existed prior
the republic had a multi national and multi religious system. Every society
or community were able to speak any language they wished or worshiped freely.
However the republic was set up as nation-state. The Turkish Republic pushed
aside multi national structure of Ottoman Empire, and established as a
one language, one religion-sect, and one nation state. This policy of one
nation state went hand-to-hand with the denial of other nations or languages.
This singularism of the republic effected the constitution, which was being
drafted. According to the definition of citizenship made in the 1924 constitution,
in relation to citizenship everyone was classified as Turks. To camouflage
this denial the rulers developed borrowed theories.
“The Turkish history thesis” and
“the Sun language theory” are amongst these. In order to implement these
denial policies they resorted to authoritarian and repressive methods.
According to the official data since the establishment of the Republic
there were 28 Kurdish uprisings, and each time these were suppressed bloody.
After every uprising millions of the Kurds were exiled to Western Turkey.
The political situation in Turkey has improved slightly after the 1961
constitution. Different parties and unions were formed. Workers, students
and young people set up their own organisations. Kurdish intellectuals
and youth have benefited from these improved conditions. Magazines and
newspapers appeared, Kurdish societies were set up under various names,
though in this period these movements were subjected to serious oppressions
and obstacles. However important rights were gained.
12 September 1980 Coup
The coup in 1980 ended all the gains
of the democratic struggle. All the democratic associations, unions and
parties where shut. All the expression and organisation possibilities were
lost. Tens thousands of democrats, intellectuals were arrested and tortured.
Tens of those were sentenced to death.
The section that was affected from
this terror wave mostly Kurds. Kurdish intellectuals and youth were arrested
and tortured sometimes without a reason. As a result of these tortures
hundreds of people died and thousands came out disabled from Diyarbakir
Military Prison known as Number 5. In this period in the name of looking
for offenders, houses and villages were raided, locals were beaten and
tortured.
Under such repressive environment
a constitution was prepared and put for referendum. As in the case of every
other dictatorial regime, when the new constitution was forced upon the
oppressed people at a referendum, it was approved by 98% of the people!
The 1982 Constitution had a completely
totalitarian character. The whole thing was designed to satisfy the Junta
leaders, all the rights and freedoms were treated as if they did not exist.
The new Constitution had taken a backward step in relation to the definition
of citizenship. The Article 66 of the 1982 constitution described everyone
who had a citizenship link with the Turkish state as Turks. Again, in this
period, the speaking of Kurdish as a language was, by the Law Decree number
2932 formally banned for the first time.
The period of torture and repression
that began with the 12 September 1980 coup had brought about disappointment
and disillusionment in all areas. This atmosphere had created conditions
for the PKK which had started armed struggle.
The armed struggle waged by PKK led
the regime to pursue a more violent and oppressive policy in the area and
institutionalise them. From the time when PKK started the armed struggle
in 1984 to 1998 when Öcalan was captured, the Kurdish region went through
a real catastrophe. Emergency Law replaced the martial law regime. State
Security Courts replaced the martial law courts. Special Team were established
under the pretext of fighting terrorism. Furthermore, a village guard system
was set up whose numbers reached over 60,000. JITEM was set up to carry
out special secret operations. During the same period, officially 30,000,
but in reality more than 50,000 lives were lost. Over 3,000 villages and
hamlets were burnt down and destroyed. More than 3 million people who inhabited
in these areas were deported or forced to leave their homes and resettled
in western cities. Tens of towns were again and again attacked and burnt
down. After 1990, more than 4 thousand people were extra-judicially killed
by secret units set up by the state. In the same period, the freedom of
expression and association were abused many, many times. Books were confiscated.
The publication of magazines and newspapers were banned, writers were imprisoned
for their writings. The Constitutional Court closed down many parties for
proposing their solutions and taking actions on the Kurdish issues.
What is the current situation?
The situation had slightly improved
after the capture of Abdullah Öcalan in 1998. Directed by Öcalan, the PKK
pulled its forces out of Turkey. Because of this, the armed clashed had
ended. At the Helsinki Summit, the European Union accepted Turkey as a
candidate member. From this date onwards, the process of EU membership
gained a prominent role in the developments in Turkey.
The EU offered Turkey, like all other
states who wished to join the EU, a Partnership Accession Document. According
to this document, Turkey was expected not only to implement the requirements
of the Copenhagen Criteria’s but also to introduce legal changes and reorganisation
in these areas. According to this, Turkey would have raised its’ legal
and administrative procedures to harmonise with those in European Union.
Unfortunately, although the Partnership
Accession Document contained important changes in the fields of democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, it used only superficial and very general
expressions with regard to the Kurdish issue. Under the heading of minority
rights, no mention was made of the existence of the Kurdish people or their
language and cultural needs.
This was just what Turkey had wanted.
For Turkey was still not recognising the existence of Kurds in Turkey,
and therefore was unwilling to be held responsible for introducing changes
in this regard. As a result, Turkey pushed aside the issue of Kurds and
Kurdish language in its’ National Programme, and portrayed it as one of
local dialects used by the Turkish citizens. The description used in the
relevant section of the National Programme is as follows: “The official
language of the Turkey is Turkish. However this is not a barrier for citizens
to use different languages and dialects in their daily life freely. This
right can not be used for separatist and divisive purposes”. Unfortunately
no meaningful steps have so far been taken in this regard. Since 2 August
2002 the Turkish parliament in order to comply with EU laws, passed 8 Harmonisation
Packages. Off course some of them contain important changes. Yet, the same
could not be said to have happened about the Kurds and their language.
The regulation concerning broadcasting in local languages and dialects
in radio and television for the Turkish citizens permits them only 60 minutes
of radio broadcasting a day and a maximum of 5 hours a week. The television
broadcasting can be only for 45 minutes a day, maximum of 4 hours a week.
It states that during the broadcasting of programs, traditional costumes
or colours will not be permitted. The TV programmes will have Turkish subtitles
and radio broadcasts will be translated into Turkish. Again, the same regulation
limited the Kurdish programmes only to the publicly owned channels. Local
TV and radio stations are not permitted to broadcast in Kurdish.
Although the above-mentioned directive
became effective when it was published in the Official Gazette on 25 January,
there has not yet been any development in this regard. The same is true
for education in Kurdish as well. This activity is covered by the regulation
regarding the establishment of private institutions offering courses in
local language and dialects to Turkish citizens. According to this regulation,
Kurdish language can be taught at private language courses. Until now,
the centres that were opened in Urfa, Batman and Van were stopped from
offering these courses on relatively superficial pretexts. Kurdish teaching
has not yet started for such bureaucratic obstacles as the width of the
entrance door to classes, the type of teachers offering these courses and
so on. The Minister for National Education stated that those who will be
teaching these courses would have to have the same qualifications as other
teachers. But, there are no institute in Turkey that train Kurdish teachers.
Those who had trained themselves through their own means at abroad or at
home are denied this opportunity because they do not fulfil all the requirements.
Furthermore, it is not clear what teaching materials and resources are
allowed at these centres. Consequently, there is a complete confusion about
education in Kurdish.
On the other hand, although the Constitutional
Article that had specifically forbidden the use of Kurdish language had
been removed, still we do not have complete freedom concerning Kurdish
language. For example, according to the Article 81 of the law concerning
the activities of political parties, political parties are not allowed
to use any other languages (by other, Kurdish is meant- BB). This ban applies
to the internal and external writing communications of the Party. Because
of this ban, a court hearing has been set for the leaders of the Rights
and Liberties Party (HAK-PAR). The Director of the Public Prosecution Service
for Ankara had filed a case against the Members of the Leadership Council
and the members of the Congress Preceding Committee of HAK-PAR because
Kurdish speeches were made at Party’s first Annual General Meeting held
on 4 January 2004. The Party leaders were interviewed on 8 March 2004 about
this.
The Constitutional Court banned many
political parties in Turkey’ because their programmes or activities contained
references and solutions about the Kurds and the Kurdish issue. Until now,
HEP, DEP, DDP, DKP were closed down because of this. Now the reasons
are given at the trials initiated by the Constitutional Court seeking the
closure of HADEP and HAK-PAR and these are still continuing. The same is
also applicable to associations.
In Diyarbakir, the Director of the
police force withheld permission to the Kurdish Writers Association (Kurd-Pen)
the formation of which was announced on 2 February. But later, the banning
decision was withdrawn.
The meeting which HAK-PAR wanted
to organise on 11 April 2004 in Diyarbakir about Turkey and Kurds in the
process of unification with the European Union’ was not allowed by the
City’ Governor. Although the ban on Kurdish names existed previously has
now been lifted, but those names that had W and X letters, which exist
in the Kurdish alphabet, are not allowed. And, the court rejected all appeals
lodged against it.
Although there are no longer any
armed conflicts in the region, the institution of the village guards is
still continuing. Their numbers are around 60,000 and have become gangrene
for the community. The US Government’s Annual Human Rights Report for 2003
published on 25th February states that the village guards who numbers 60,000
were heavily involved in drug-trafficking, rape, bribery, robber and human
rights abuses and that the gendarmerie were protecting them from prosecution.
In addition, no development had taken
place nor any arrests were made with regard to the cases of extra-judicial
killings taken place in the 1990s.´In order to harmonise with EU, some
progress was made with regard to freedom of thought and expression. The
Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Law, which posed a serious obstacle against
the freedom of thought and expression, has now been lifted, but instead
the Article 312 of the Turkish criminal Law is being applied. Although
sentencing under the Article 312,
this infamous Article which was used
against so many intellectuals, journalists and politicians for alleging
that ‘through discrimination and separation on the grounds of race, religion
and language, they incited people for hatred and enmity’ has been reduced
to 3 years by the 1st Harmonisation Package, it still is a serious problem.
Another obstacle against the freedom
of thought and expression is Article 159 of the Turkish Criminal Law. This
Article represents the biggest barrier against criticising those organs
of the state such as police, army and judiciary. Books and publications
that relate to the Kurdish issue, though there is a softening of approach,
are still facing threats of ban and seizures. For example, courts decided
for the seizure against 14 books published by the Deng Publishers. Although
as a result of the recent changes, the court decision to seize held against
two books were lifted, but the decision held against others are still being
upheld. Among the books the courts ordered to be seized is Ahmede Xani's
famous book ‘Mem u Zin’ as well. Equally, the periodical of Deng Magazine,
which until now published 72 issues, 41 issues of it had been seized by
courts. 19 issues of the fortnightly Dema Nu paper, which is published
in Kurdish and Turkish had been met with court seizure and a number of
charges are brought against its’ editors. In the year 2003 alone, charges
were brought against tens of writers and 40 of the books printed. After
11 years, the DEP members of Parliament are still being kept in prison.
After the decision of the European Court of Human Rights asking a re-trial,
their case was tried again by the Court No 1 of the State Security Court
in Ankara. The Court, after a long hearing, has decided to uphold the decision
held against Leyla Zana, Hatip Dicle, Orhan Dogan and Selim Sadak, which
sentenced to 15 years imprisonment.
In the recent period, the Extraordinary
Law Situation in the region was lifted. But in its’ place a coordinator
Governor has been appointed whose status is not yet clearly defined. Also,
the Special Teams set up for the purpose of fighting against Terrorism
have still not been dissolved.
As is well known, in the 1990s more
than three million people were forcibly resettled in other areas after
their homes and villages were burnt down and destroyed. This has led to
a total collapse in the Kurdish society. The forced deportation has caused
millions to leave agricultural activity and live in great poverty, unemployment
and hunger. The lives of those who were forcibly deported from their homes
did not cause economic hardships alone, but created a social, cultural
and psychological collapse as well. Today these people are living on the
outskirts of metropolitan cities and towns a miserable life. Because they
are deprived of employment and bread, they do not benefit from other social
benefits such as health, education and so on. Off course this damages the
social textures of the cities as well.
Apart from a very small number, no
one has yet been permitted to return to their villages. Although there
is no longer any armed conflict in the region, the security reason is being
used as a pretext to deny these people their return to their original homes
and places. In some places, the security forces are demanding from those
who want to go back that they should sign a document stating that they
were forced to leave their villages by the PKK in the first place.
In spite of the Government’s zero
tolerance policy, the use of torture and ill-treatment is still widespread
in Turkey. The US Annual
Human Rights Report confirms that
much more people of left-wing persuasion and Kurdish human rights defenders
had faced torture. According to the Annual report of the Turkish Human
Rights Association, in 2003 there were 774 cases that fit the definition
of crimes of thought in Turkey. At least 68 cases were brought under the
Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Law (TCL) which state that through
discrimination and separation on the grounds of race, religion and language,
the incitement of people for hatred and enmity’ is a punishable crime.
26 of these cases that concluded in 2003, in 10 cases the charges were
upheld and 16 of them ended in acquittal.
Under the Article 6 of the Anti-Terror
Law (ATL) which is designed against crimes of ‘printing the statements
of illegal organisation’, 175 cases were brought to courts, and of the
91 cases that were concluded; in 84 of them the charges were upheld. Under
Article 8 of the same law, which covers crimes of ‘propagating against
the unity and indivisibility of the state and nation’ (separatist propaganda);
at least 38 cases were initiated. 35 of them had concluded and in 13 of
them, the charges were upheld. This Article was later on removed. Under
Article 7 of the Anti-Terror Law (ATL) that covers crimes of ‘propagating
for illegal organisations’ at least 39 charges were brought to courts.
The Reports states that the charges brought against newspapers and magazines
resulted in a total of 370 days closures for them, and the private radio
and television channels were closed for a total 480 days by Radio, Television
High Counsel (RTUK). In their meeting held on 27-28 January and 11, 19
and 24 February, RTUK decided to stop the broadcasting of programmes against
the following radio and TV channels: Star TV (3 times), Kana 6-Anadolu
(3 times), TGRT (3 times), Flash TV, CNBC-e, TGRT, Gun TV (Diyarbakir),
FM 12-Bingol (3 times), TGRT, TV 21 (Diyarbakir), Gun FM (Diyarbakir).
What changes were brought about by
Legislations?
In the last few years, the Parliament,
beginning with the Constitution, through 7 Harmonisation Packages made
changes in great many codes of law. The 8th Packages has just been approved
by the Parliament. 27 of the 34 changes made in the Constitution concerned
human rights. Some changes were made only to the wording, some would not
cause any serious legal consequence, and some of the other changes did
not represent any change from the previous ones. Because the changes were
not of substance, the rights of thoughts and expression, the strengthening
of the democratic and civilian authority, the right of association and
gathering, the right to a fair trial, equality between man and woman, could
not be brought to levels of universal norms.
One of the important changes introduced
that concerned the Kurds was the repeal of a legislation that enabled the
banning of Kurdish language in the constitution. Thus, a law no other civilised
nation had, had been removed.
Following this, changes were made
to Articles about crimes of thought. In this regard, the Article 8 of the
ATL was first softened and then was removed in its entirety. Article 7
of that law was amended to deal with only those crimes that advocate violence
and terror, but the financial penalties that could be given was increased.
The laws that acted as a barrier
to freedom of expression in the Turkish Criminal Law (TCL) were also changed.
The Article 159 of the TCL which was used like the sward of Damocles against
those criticising the police, army and judiciary was reformulated so that
opinions expressed or statement made for the purpose of criticism are no
longer punishable acts and the minimum sentence was reduced to 6 months,
and the maximum to years imprisonment. Many enlightened intellectuals,
journalists and politicians were sentenced under the Article 312, charged
with inciting hatred and enmity through separating and discriminating,
when all they ever made was making constructive criticism by highlighting
issues, and raising awareness about them. This Article was amended in the
First Harmonisation Package; the sentencing level was reduced to 3 years.
But, the possibility of committing this crime through publications was
nevertheless retained. The relevant Article today still remains one of
the main obstacles confronting the freedom of thought. Only the extent
of the Article 169 of the TCL which covers acts of ‘aiding and abetting
armed organisations’ was made narrower. The Laws concerning association,
the rights of meetings and demonstration was changed to have fever limitations.
For example, all 18 years olds and were capable of acts were given the
right to set up an association. But those who were convicted before for
some crimes, even when they were released as a result of an amnesty, would
not have the right to set up an association. Those who were convicted under
Article 312 were denied this right for 5 years.
Party closures were made difficult.
But, party closures were not repealed. However,
instead of party closures, the punishment
of depriving parties from receiving state funds was brought in. The concept
of outlawed language in the press law was repealed and the closure time
of those media organisation charged under this law was shortened but, very
heavy fines were introduced.
What is to be done?
A number other changes which we
could describe as positive were introduced. But these were not strong and
extensive enough to satisfy EU expectations from neither Turkey nor those
sections that had for so long demanded democratisation and a jurisprudent
state. The obstacles confronting the freedom of thought are still there.
The defective criterions such as the ‘unitary state’, ‘secular Republic’,
‘the preservation of the national unity’ continues to keep their places
within the legislative world. This situation is going to continue as long
as it is not clearly stated that the only lawful obstacles, which is recognised
by universal legal principles and by various international treaties in
relation to freedom of thought, are only those that praises racism and
those which in the near and long term future may incite and lead to violence.
The Harmonisation process has not
seriously changed those barriers and anti-democratic statutes facing political
parties, which are essential components of democratic political system.
The Prohibition Relating to Political
Parties and the section concerning the Closure of Political Parties which
the Law of Political Parties has, must be revised again in the light of
the relevant decisions of the European Court of Human Rights and a recognition
in constitution of political parties as essential component of democratic
political system and all those anti-democratic statutes be removed and
necessary legal conditions for all thoughts and group’s organisation be
created.
The ban on the use of Kurdish by
political parties is still continuing. The statute of the
Article 81 of the Law of Political
Parties, which is titled ‘the stopping of the creation of a minority’ must
be repealed, all attempts
to stop parties from raising issues
about the diversity of language and cultures in the country must be ceased.
The right to form association and
the right to hold meetings and demonstration within the framework of the
Harmonisation Laws have not been reformulated in accordance with democratic
requirements. For promoting and strengthening of the developments of civil
societies, the legal procedures must be revised again.
The necessary and sufficient legal
changes needed to enable the right to have mother-tongue education have
not been introduced. The right enabled by a directive allowed the setting
up of only private courses and was attached with very strict conditions
but was emptied of its’ contents and made the use of the right useless.
The right to have education and teaching in one’s mother tongue is a requirement
of the international laws and universal human rights. All the anti-democratic
barriers erected against the use of this right must be lifted, Kurdish
must be recognised as a language of education, the state must assume a
positive role in this matter and accordingly, reorganise the education
system.
In the same way, a similar approach
is pursued in relation to radio and television broadcasting, those barriers
that limits and made the use of the right dysfunctional all be removed
and the right to broadcast in Kurdish be recognised at a national level
without any restrictions. In order for this right be implemented, the state
must take supportive, empowering measures.
The independence and impartiality
of judiciary, which is an essential requirement of a democratic jurisprudent
state, must be protected both in law and in practice.
The law while creating foundations
for the publications in Kurdish by removing of the concept of banned languages
from legal procedures continues to hold the stick of ‘the
indivisibility of the state and the
nation’ in its hand.
While lesser punishment levels are
set as a result of the new regulations, those respon-
sible could not escape imprisonments,
the heavy fines imposed would force, especially the opposition into financial
ruin, in the press and media, the arena will be left only for cartels and
financial magnets.
If one looks at it carefully, one
can clearly see that all those anti-democratic laws were put in place by
those nationalists who want hegemony and have paranoia about separation.
The fears about the Kurdish issue still pose the biggest barriers against
harmonising the laws in line with democratic jurispru-
dent state. This understanding is
governed by the classical nation-state approach is
afraid of a changed, diversified
Turkey and all energy is used about this fear. Beginning with the constitution,
this tension can clearly be detected in all the laws.
Off course, constitutions have special
importance because they provide the basis and philosophies of all laws.
It is very clear that the laws emanating from a constitution based on democratic,
pluralist and multi-ethnic realities would also be democratic. Seen from
this perspective, the recognition of Kurds and their identity in the constitution
represent a crucial step for solution of the Kurdish issue and democracy
in Turkey.
The Commission of the EU should
lay down a Schedule for the Fulfilment of the Demands and for Co-operation
with Kurdish Representatives
By Keya
Izol, Kurdish Platform in Europe
(Representative of political
organisations, NGOs and individuals - Turkey )
The Kurdish Platform in Europe is
a European network of different European-wide Kurdish organisations and
was established on 21 July 2002 in Stockholm as voice of the Kurds living
in the European Diaspora.
"Kurdish Initiatives by Kurdish
intellectuals in different European countries, "European Co-ordination
of the Kurdish NGO (DEMKURD)" and "National Platform of the Kurdish political
parties in Northern Kurdistan"
“The Kurdish Platform in Europe”
dealing mainly with the question whether the Turkey is going to fulfil
the Copenhagen political criteria and the European Union will open accession
negotiations with her in December 2004. After important discussions, the
meeting decided concerning the fulfilment of Copenhagen political criteria
to start with campaigns in different European countries. The Platform decided
also to formulate a catalogue of demands to the European Union, which is
very important and vital in view of the Platform concerning the implementation
of Copenhagen political criteria by Turkey.
The European Union as a peaceful
and democratic entity must decide about Turkey’s request for membership
at the end of this year. The request has started debate and questions
in European public opinion. Turkey’s membership can only be realised if
Turkey becomes a state truly respectful of laws and universal standards
of democracy and human rights and at peace with its neighbours and its
own citizens.
But despite official statements and
promised democratic “reforms” which remain superficial and are rarely really
applied, Turkey still has not dealt with the fundamental question of the
status and rights of its Kurdish citizens. This failure is all the more
striking since for decades the Kurdish problem has been at the very centre
of Turkey’s political life, its institutions and civil peace as well as
its international relations to a great degree.
And because more than a million Kurds
live in European Union states, the Kurdish problem is also a European problem.
The Kurds, who account for more than a quarter of Turkey’s population,
demand justice.
They demand justice from Europe whose
colonial powers after World War One drew up the map of the Middle East
without taking into account the Kurds’ rights and desire for self-determination.
Europe thus condemned the Kurds to a long series of persecutions, massacres
and disasters. At long last Europe now must assume its responsibility and
start redressing the historic injustice inflicted on the Kurds.
The Kurds demand justice from modern
Turkey, which from its very foundation advertised itself as a state of
both Kurds and Turks, but used all means at its disposal to destroy the
Kurds’ collective identity, culture and civilisation. These policies caused
much suffering, hobbled Turkey’s own democratisation, badly tarnished Turks’
image in the eyes of Middle Eastern and international public opinion.
But the Kurdish question refused to go away and today has more relevance
than ever before.
The time has come to turn this dark
page in the centuries of relations between Turks and Kurds and to open
a new chapter based on justice, equal rights, respect for the identity
and culture of both peoples. Turkish leaders would be well advised
to think back to the Ottoman tradition of tolerance, which by granting
wide-ranging autonomy allowed three centuries of peace with the Kurds.
Turkey’s leaders could also prove their coherence and fairness by granting
their 15 to 20 million Kurds the same status and rights that Ankara demands
for the some 120,000
Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish leaders
must come to accept that peoples with different languages and cultures
can cohabit peacefully inside the same state while respecting democracy,
equal rights and equal identity for everyone.
If Turkey wants to become part of
Europe it must be inspired in its goal of a multicultural society not by
the authoritarian states of the Middle East, but by the example of such
European countries as Belgium, Spain, Britain or Switzerland.
But is it possible to talk about
equality and justice when one of Turkey’s two founding peoples has a dozen
television networks, schools and universities all using Turkish while the
Kurds still do not have the right to teach their age-old language to their
children, to have schools and media using their own tongue or institutions
and parties to enjoy freedom of expression and association and the peaceful
defence of their rights?
Can Europe’s democratic conscience
indefinitely tolerate such double standards?
The negotiating process between Turkey
and the European Unions offers an historic chance to re-examine these problems
from the bottom up and find a fair compromise for the peaceful and durable
settlement of the Kurdish question in Turkey.
The Kurdish Platform in Europe, who
attached to the values of justice and democracy call on European leaders
to demand that Turkey honours its commitments to the international conventions
and treaties that it has signed so its Kurdish fellow citizens enjoy the
same justice, status and rights as ethnic Turks in Turkey. Justice should
be the same for all.
We ask the EU to remind Turkey of
our demands;
Adoption of a new, democratic, modern
and a European constitution which recognises also officially the existence
of the Kurdish people and to guarantee its rights;
Linguistic rights for the Kurdish
children in their mother tongue for the in the entire
education system of Turkey and under
national warranties. Kurds should have the right to use their mother tongue
at every stage of the education system;
Equal rights and use of the Kurdish
language in national broadcasting corporations and in private ones as well
as in printed media;
There should be no limitations to
broadcasting in radio and television and all types of media communications
in Kurdish;
All paramilitary organisations such
as JITEM, Special Teams and Village Guards that were
products of dirty warfare should
be abolished and held accountable for the crimes they committed;
The freedom of expression and opinion
and the right to organise should be guaranteed to all those who does not
use resort to violence. Establishment of Kurdish associations, organisations
and parties, and the publicly use of the Kurdish language in word and writing;
Kurdish political parties be given the right to organise themselves with
their own identity and whatever legal change is required for this purpose,
be completed;
An unconditional general amnesty
covering all political prisoners is declared;
The ratification of International
conventions by the parliament of the Republic of Turkey and renouncement
of all reservations to the articles, which concern the rights of Kurds
and other minorities;
Improvement of 46 fundamental laws
that either totally forbid or limit the collective rights of more than
20 million Kurds in Turkey;
The right to Kurdish names for Kurdish
children without restrictions. Re-establishment of the Kurdish local and
settlement names as well as in the past in Turkish changed names in fauna
and Flora;
Repatriation of millions of Kurdish
evictees whose villages and hamlets were damaged and destroyed during the
period of the martial law and state of emergency phase in the Kurdish regions
and their financial compensation;
The Commission of the EU should
lay down a schedule for the fulfilment of the demands specified above and
to co-operate with Kurdish representatives.
Turkey with its current status,
does not deserve to become a
member of the EU
Report of the Kurdistan
Socialist Party
on the political developments
in Turkey
and the EU-Accession
Kurdistan Socialist Party
e-mail: psk@kurdistan.nu
www.kurdistan.nu
Turkey is going to be on the agenda
of the Summit Meeting of the European Union in December 2004. If the European
Council in December 2004, based on a report and a recommendation from the
Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria,
the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey.
Is it true that the Turkish government
has done its entire home works? Does Turkey fulfil the Copenhagen criteria?
The Turkish Government is claiming that it has carried out all of the reforms.
Yet, 2003 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession, the report
which was adopted at session of the European Parliament on 31st March 2004
(Reporter: Arie M. Oostlander) and the reports published by nongovernmental
organizations (NGO’s) all confirm that this is not so. These reports state
that the lack of civilian control of the military gives cause for concern.
This is reflected by the major role played by the military in political
life through the National Security Council (MGK). By administrative measures,
most of the legal reforms are not implemented.
‘Harmonisation’ packages do not apply
to the Military!
The reforms concerning the role
of the Army are a good example of why the steps taken to comply with the
EU regulations are just window dressing and those rights granted are now
being withheld by these new arrangements.
The report on Turkey written by Arie
Oostlander (MEP), which was adopted by the General Assembly of the European
Parliament reflected the reality very clearly when it said “The European
Parliament is concerned about the official and unofficial effects of the
military”.
Nevertheless, in practice the Turkish
army continues to use formal structures and informal mechanisms to influence
Turkish political life. It has not yet withdrawn from the Board of Higher
Education (YÖK) or the Higher Board for Radio and Television (RTÜK).
The later directives bypassed the
changes regarding the General Secretariat of the National Security Council
adopted on 30 July 2003 in the seven Harmonisation Packages. In other words,
those powers of the National Security Council concerning the arrangement
of politics except defence taken away by the seven Harmonisation Packages
have been given back by another measure. The new measure stipulates that
in the case of the Secretary General being of a military background, his
deputy will be a civilian or if he is civilian then his deputy will be
a member of army. Furthermore, apart from the defence, those powers of
the armed forces to direct, define, correct politics and the preparation
of action plans and civilian services and to make war preparation plans
which were curtailed by the seven Harmonisation Packages were returned
back to the National Security Council by the new measures.
The Turkish Government is seeking
to implement a project by which the gendarmerie gets powers to gather intelligence,
pursue terror and organized crimes etc. in the cities
as well. Currently, in 90 per cent
of the rural areas the Gendarmerie is in charge of the security. With this
project, in the cities the army alongside the police will become an effective
force.
The news of the Commander of the
Diyarbakir Gendarmerie was widely reported in press who disregarded the
legal procedures and demanded from public prosecutor the list of all those
who applied to courts for the right to be given Kurdish name and that they
were under investigation. What was so serious about this incident was the
fact that the public prosecutor who was responsible for implementing the
changes adopted in the seven Harmonisation Packages, has collaborated with
the policy of the Commander of the Province Gendarmerie.
Furthermore, it was reported in the
press and the Chief of Staff had to acknowledge its existence, the Commander
of the Land Forces had sent a directive to local administrators asking
them to gather information on those who were suspected of separatist and
destructive activities. The Land Forces directives is asking local governors
and mayors to collect the names of those national and foreign organizations
with whom separatist and destructive organizations were in contact, the
names of diplomats and their activities, in a possible election with whom
separatists were likely to form pacts, missionaries and the organizations
backing their activities and send it to them.
In addition, the directive asks for
information to be gathered about the names of those groups who tended to
see themselves as minorities meaning those who do not see themselves as
Turks, the names of those writers and artists who are working against Turkey.
What was most interesting about that directive was that in that same directive,
it was asking the names of all those who were known to be pro-EU and USA
to be added to the list.
The list of organizations, groups
and individuals, which the Land Forces Commander wanted, was not limited
to these alone. In addition to these, it asks for information about the
names of philosophical groups,
action groups, as well as “high society
groups”, the groups to which artists belonged, the groups to which the
children of rich families belonged, sects (Satanists, Ku Klux Klan, Free
Masons etc.), internet groups, sexual groups, drug abusers, meditation
groups, spiritualists) to be added to the list.
“EMASYA” linked with the Military
The activities of the armed forced
are not just limited to gathering information about and registering those
who were pro-USA and EU and those members of the high society classes alone.
Those who prepared this “list of
traitors” such as “the supporters of the European Union, the advocates
of the Second Republic, enemies of the Army, those who were against the
ideology of Atatürk” were members of an organization known as EMASYA, an
organization which is linked to the army.
According to press reports, the organization
EMASYA “Units of Security, Order and Co-Operation” (EMASYA-“Emniyet, Asayiþ
Yardýmlaþma Birlikleri”) was established under a law on Province Administration
and was set up in the 1960s. This law stipulates that in situations where
governors, when faced with serious social movements, could ask for assistance
from the armed forces. In order to intervene the army told they should
have information about every citizen, so that they could register them.
This practice continued until 1970.
After 1997, i.e. in the year when the process for the EU membership was
begun in Turkey, the structure of the EMASYA Units was changed by a protocol,
reached between the Ministry of Interior and the Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. This Protocol gave the EMASYA units powers to intervene, whenever
they deemed right, unimportant whether governors demanded such action or
not. From 1997 onwards, the EMASYA units became units working 24 hours
and waiting on alarms.
The EMASYA units have thus become
units working under the Land Forces but can demand information from governors
and give
them instructions as well. With the
help of this Protocol, the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff gained the
control of such civilian institutions as governors and mayors. In short,
the units of EMASYA have the power to watch over the whole society.
It is an established international
principle that protocols should not contradict the constitution and laws.
However, the Turkish Government, in spite of such international principles,
had not cancelled this protocol, which increases the powers of the army.
Is it still possible, in spite of
all these, to claim that the Turkish Government has completed one of its
most important homework, which is the task of eradicating the influence
the army over the political life?
We believe this is not the case.
The Justice and Development Party
(AKP), due to its ideological formation are under close army scrutiny.
The AKP Government is afraid that the army might turn against it. And the
army certainly keeps this fear alive by its constant statements. The AKP,
in order not to scare the army, is avoiding taking serious and democratic
steps, which would break army’s influence over politics.
The Constitution of the September
12th is still in force!
Turkish governments, in order to
implement some of the promises made in the National Accord, wanted to take
some steps. However, they could not get the approval of the National Security
Council in some cases. Some of the legal changes agreed upon became irrelevant
by later administrative measures.
The amendments made to the constitution
are very superficial. “Turkey has retained a Constitution adopted in 1982
during the military regime, reflecting a largely authoritarian philosophy.”
(Draft Res. of EP March 2004).
This fact is recognized by country’s
top lawyers and bar associations that the 1982 Constitution is a product
of the 12 September military junta. From the beginning to the end, it is
undemocratic. That is why it would
not be possible to correct it by
amendments. As the retired Head of the Supreme Court of Appeal, Mr. Sami
Selcuk, has said, “It is not a constitution, but police statute.”
The 1982 Junta Constitution was designed
only for protecting the state against citizens who were seen as potential
criminals, disrespected, distrusted and feared and not for the protection
of the rights and liberties of the citizens. For this reason, it is more
of a list of directives curtailing and limiting rights and liberties.
This constitution is full with racist-chau-vinistic
sentiments. The introduction is a statement of unparalleled racism. While
the Turkish heritage and culture is promoted into a fetish, the existence
of other people and their cultures are denied.
As indicated in Arie Outlander’s
Report, a Dutch parliamentarian, there is a need for a civilian constitution.
Situation of the Human Rights Standards
Turkey has agreed upon many harmonisations
packages since February 2002 in order to get a date for the opening of
accessions negotiations. According to Turkish government’s claim, as a
result of harmonisation packages, the country had reached the European
standards in human rights, democratic rights and liberties. Torture and
ill treatment is no more systematic.
The reports of institutions working
in human rights fields points out that Turkey is still further away from
these stated objectives. So much that even the Turkish government, who
claimed to have completed all the homework and pressed for a date, had
to admit that there were shortcomings in the implementation, which they
must improve.
A report by the Turkish Human Rights
Foundation, a highly respected Nongovernmental Organization, lays bare
the situation of the rights and liberties in Turkey.
According to their “2003 Freedom
of Expression Report”, the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey states that
in the year 2003
there were 774 cases, fitting the
definition of the ‘crime of expression’. It states that in 2003 the repression
of those political parties, non-governmental organizations, journalists,
writers and artists, who did not conform to the official version of thinking,
has continued. There were 774 cases filed against writers and intellectuals
for expressing their opinions in speech or in their writings in newspapers,
magazines or books. Furthermore, it stated that out of more than 70 cases
in which the prosecutor alleged “for insulting and degrading the state,
republic, security and armed forces”, 21 of them was concluded and in seven
cases charges were held and punishment issued.
Now let us have a look at the Report
published in 2003 by the Human Rights Association in Diyarbakir.
According to the Report, in 2003
85 persons had lost their lives in extra judicially killing and attacks
by unknown assailants. 21 persons lost their lives from the land mines.
548 persons have made a complaint to the Human Rights Association for being
tortured and ill treatment. 1298 public sector employee had been investigated
for their opinions and actions. 40 applications to hold events in the region
were turned down. According to the Report, 5625 rights abuses have occurred
in the region, of these 2098 persons reported them to the HRA.
Diyarbakir is a small part of Northern
Kurdistan. The number of human rights abuses taken place in the whole of
Kurdistan is much higher. Of course, these only indicate the numbers of
those who had the courage to report them to the Diyarbakir HRA. We should
remember that many human rights abuses that take place in the rural areas
are not reported to responsible institutions for fear of Gendarmerie and
Special Teams, because those who complain are severely punished.
The Reports of the Human Rights Association
in Istanbul entitled ‘The Human Rights Abuses in Istanbul in 2003’ contains
the following information:
‘In 2003, 34 children, 92 woman,
in total 283 persons had reported to the HRA in Istanbul complaining of
being tortured and ill treated. 138 newspapers and magazines were confiscated.
Within a year, jail terms of 62 years and 10 months and fines of 287 billion,
462 million and 139 thousand liras in total were issued. The Report also
states that five buildings belonging to political parties were bombed.
The Headquarters of the Human Rights
Association in Ankara had also issued an annual report of human rights
abuses throughout the year 2003. The Report of the HRA creates the following
picture:
‘Because of extra-judicial killings,
44 persons died and 49 persons were wounded. Of these, 13 have been killed
by security forces for not stopping when cautioned by them and 12 have
been shot by the so called village guards.
‘In 2003 20 persons lost their lives
due to conditions in prisons. 11 of these were the result of suicides,
two because of hunger strike, one set fire to himself; three were killed
after being attacked by other inmates, 3 died for not being medically treated.
The number of people tortured in prisons was 113. Two persons lost their
lives in detention, and 818 persons had faced ill treatment. Ten cases
of death in detention are still being heard in courts.
“In 2003, of the total of 222 persons
who were attacked by the police, 99 were students, 66 journalists, 11 political
party leaders, 11 teachers, 8 trade unionists, 8 managers of associations
and charitable trusts and 9 were members of the local council.
“In 2003, only in four cities, 98
cassettes, 23 books and 25 magazines were either confiscated or banned.
24 newspapers and magazines were closed, 26 arts events were not allowed
to take place. 30 times the offices of newspapers and magazines were raided,
11 TV and radio stations were ordered to close for a total of 480 days.
“In 2003, 171 people were sentenced
to 324 years imprisonment for political crimes, fined for 5 billion Liras,
736 persons were sent into exile, 46 buildings of political parties were
raided by police.
In the meantime, an interesting incident
happened in the city of Van. The local court in Van banned a poster, produced
by the Van Human Rights Association on the occasion of International Human
Rights Day. This decision was circulated to other regions and the poster
was banned in those areas as well.
What if there would not have been
a letter by Powell?
The story of how the court case
brought against the policemen accused of killing Birtan Altintas, a university
student, by torturing him while in detention 10 years ago, has proceeded,
is important for showing how much the Turkish governments were sincere
in their desire to stop the use of torture and ill treatment.
It seemed the court could not try
those accused policemen wanted in connection of Birtan Altintas’s case,
because they could not be found in their addresses and court papers could
not be served on them. Yet, two of the accused policemen were retired and
are getting their pensions every month. In fact, one of them had worked
as an advisor to a minister in Ecevit's coalition government. Some of the
accused had left the police service and were appointed to other posts in
the public sector.
A country, who wants to be a candidate
to become a member of European Union and whose government manages to produce
a number of legislations against the use of torture and ill treatment,
these paid officers could not be tried because their whereabouts were not
known! In which state in the world could such a strange thing happen?
After the US Secretary of State Colin
Powell wrote a letter to his Turkish counterpart in which he talked about
his unhappiness about the way Birtan Altinbas’s case was progressing, the
accused policemen were found, tried and sentenced. But still they have
not been
sent to prison. The reason is that
the state cannot find them but still pays them their salaries regularly.
The reports of Human rights associations
and the case of Birtan Altintas show that even though the AKP government
had declared ‘zero tolerance against torture’ the abuses of human rights
are continuing. It has become clear that those governments who produced
stability pacts, instead of implementing the measures they promised to
take, were intending to take only very limited steps and are unwilling
to take serious steps to grant its citizens human rights.
What about the human and national
rights of Kurds?
What happened to those who demanded
to have courses in their mother tongue, Kurdish names and those who used
spoke Kurdish?
By the terms of the third Harmonisation
Package that was adopted on August 3rd 2002, the death sentence was lifted
except in cases of war or real threat of war situations. Because of the
changes made to some of the laws, the road for television and radio broadcasting
in different local dialects spoken by citizens in their daily life was
opened and the right of teaching in these language and dialects at private
courses was granted.
Since then nearly two years have
passed. The things that happened during these times show that the Turkish
officials are not serious about these policies and are trying to gain more
time by spreading their implementation thinly over time.
After the right to teach traditional
language and dialects was granted by the Harmonisation Package, what had
happened to those students and their parents who demanded from the university
and school administrations to have these rights is beyond anyone’s imagination.
Those students who demanded these rights were expelled from their universities,
together with their parents were arrested and sent to prisons, prosecution
were initiated against them.
Those who were brave enough to withstand
pressures by gendarmerie and sought to exercise their rights granted under
the Harmonisation Packages by changing their names, were this time held
in courts. Some courts rejected these applications on the ground that these
applications for the change of name will add nothing to the character of
the Turkish Republic, which is a democratic, secular state in law, respectful
of human rights. Another reason given for their refusal was that in the
Turkish alphabet there were no such letters as Q, W and X.
The directives concerning the ‘Teaching
of Traditional Languages and Dialects’ make the learning in mother tongues
highly conditional. It is a condition for those who want to join such courses
that they must have at least completed the primary school education. Another
condition is that the courses can only be held on weekends and during working
hours. During the courses, the display of separatist colours such as yellow,
red and green is banned.
What has happened to those who wanted
to set up private Kurdish courses by exercising their rights granted by
the 3rd Harmonisation Package allowing the teaching of traditional language
and dialects are stuffs, from which films can be made. Only two teaching
centres in Urfa and Batman managed to overcome the bureaucratic red tapes
about the ‘low ceiling on entry doors’ and ‘narrow windows’. Further obstacles
set in other areas are still continuing.
After the 3rd Stability Pact had
become effective granting the right to teach in traditional languages and
dialects, 30 students were excluded for periods ranging from a month to
a year at Cukurova University. The reasons for this were ‘singing in the
local dialects, dancing to ideological tunes in local costumes, potentially
capable of endangering publicly owned properties and speaking in Kurdish
and Arabic’ at the cultural activities they had organized.
After the 3rd Harmonisation Package
had become effective granting citizens the right to broadcast in traditional
languages and dialects on television and radio, the Higher
Board for Radio and Television (RTÜK)
issued a directive describing the conditions under which broadcasting in
languages other than Turkish can be permitted. This directive, which was
published in the Official Gazette on January 25th 2004, is truly a piece
of comedy.
The directive gives only the state-owned
radio and television channels the right to broadcast in the traditional
languages and dialects. The other local and regional channels would have
to wait for RTÜK to produce a profile of listeners and viewers! Of course,
it is not clear when this is going to be done.
The directive limits broadcasting
in traditional languages to 5 hours on radio and 4 hours on television,
and makes instant subtitling of the dialogue a condition of the broadcasting.
The directive proscribes the production of children cartoon films. The
objective of this measurement is the stop children from learning their
mother tongues. That is to continue the policy of assimilation by other
means.
Although much time has passed since
the 3rd Harmonisation Package was made into law, there has been no broadcasting
on any national radio and television channels in any of the traditional
language and dialects. This example alone is sufficient to describe how
much the Turkish government officials are sincere in their desire to implement
the conditions of the Harmonisation Packages.
To offer just 5 hours of radio broadcasting
per week and 4 hours television broadcasting per week in Kurdish to 20
million Kurds living in Turkey and make this offer to incredibly difficult
conditions is both an attempt to weaken the Criteria set in Copenhagen
and to laugh at the Kurdish people.
What happened to politicians and
parties who advocate the Kurdish Question?
Turkey is a graveyard of political
parties, especially of those parties that discuss the Kurdish question
and advocate a solution of this issue in their programme. In Turkey, up
to now, many political parties have been
banned for disregarding the constitution,
a product of the fascist September 12th period
and the laws on political parties.
While some of the leaders of these parties were imprisoned and tortured,
some became victims of extra-judicial killings and the right to engage
in politics were withheld from some others.
The Second Harmonisation Package
adopted on March 26th 2002 created some changes in the law on political
parties. But, in practice nothing has changed!
After the Second Harmonisation Package
came into effect, HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) was closed down. Proceedings
were initiated to ban HAK-PAR (the Rights and Liberties Party) immediately
after being founded. The case is continuing.
Although many legal changes were
introduced, even today the leaders of political parties are being prosecuted
for using Kurdish during their political campaign. During the election
campaign the leader of HAK-PAR was detained for speaking in Kurdish with
the constituents in Diyarbakir, where he was candidate for parliament elections.
He was sentenced to six months jail for speaking in Kurdish at a meeting
organized by the supporters of his party in Urfa.
Leaders of HAK-PAR were taken to
courts for issuing invitations in Kurdish and Turkish to their party’s
first congress and speaking Kurdish there. The court proceeding brought
against the Party and its leaders for the first congress is continuing.
Again, the meeting which HAK-PAR
organised in Diyarbakir about ‘Turkey in EU Process and Kurds”, was banned
by the local Governor.
While the state wants to join the
European Union and has for this purpose introduced ‘Harmonisation Packages’,
it would not tolerate the views of Kurdish people about Turkey’s EU process
and ban their meeting.
If all these actions are not just
obvious disregards of EU and its standards, what is it then?
The EU must stand for its principles!
One of the Copenhagen Criteria is
‘the sustainability of institutions, democracy and defence of the rule
of law, respect for human rights and protection of minority rights’.
If we consider all these developments,
which we indicated above a summary, we will see that Turkey had not made
the necessary administrative re-organizations required by the Copenhagen
Criteria, especially those political ones, had not implemented any those
changes that have been agreed upon, and is weakening the Copenhagen Criteria
by issuing demagogic statements. Instead of altering itself to fit EU,
it is seeking to change EU to fit itself.
The AKP Government, who repeatedly
claimed to be willing to fulfil Copenhagen Political Criteria and to be
a member of EU, is not conducting a determined struggle against those forces
that are against the Harmonisation Packages and blocking their implementations.
On the contrary, it is seeking to compromise with them. By making some
superficial changes, it is trying to get a date to open accession negotiations
with EU.
The Socialist Party of Kurdistan
supports the opening of accession negotiations with EU if Turkey fulfils
the Copenhagen Political Criteria without exceptions.
At the same time, we believe that
the Kurdish issue can not be solved even by the implementation of Copenhagen
Criteria, because the Kurdish issue is a national question. It can only
be solved by the recognition of the Kurdish people’s right to self-determination,
according to UN Conventions and other international standards.
We wish the membership of Turkey
in the European Union. However, if the EU wants to avoid becoming like
Turkey, it must defend its principles, and should not let Turkey dilute
these principles. It should not give Turkey a date to open accession negotiations
until Turkey fully implements the Copenhagen Criteria.
We ask the EU to remind Turkey of
our demands which are listed below:
1. To adopt a new, democratic, modern
and a European constitution, which officially recognizes the existence
of the Kurdish people, and to guarantee its rights.
2. The freedom of expression, speech
and the right to organize should be guaranteed to all those who do not
use resort to violence.
3. Kurds should have the right to
use their mother tongue at every stage of the education system.
4. There should be no limitations
to broadcasting in radio, television, and all types of media communications
in Kurdish.
5. All paramilitary organizations
such as JITEM, Special Teams and Village Guards that were products of dirty
warfare should be abolished and held accountable for the crimes they committed.
6. Kurdish political parties should
be given the right to organize themselves with their own identity and whatever
legal change is required for this purpose, should be completed.
7. The state needs to withdraw its
hand from religion. Each community (Muslims, Christians, Jews, Yezidi,
Assyrians and Alevi,) should have the right to practice their religion
freely through their own institutions.
8. An unconditional general amnesty
covering all should be declared.
We are in favour of giving a date
for opening of accession negotiations with EU only when Turkey has fully
implemented the Copenhagen Political Criteria without exceptions and taken
serious steps towards solving the Kurdish issue.
Opening of accession negotiations
with Turkey, who still denies the basic national and democratic rights
for the Kurdish people, will encourage the Turkey not to respect European
Standards and to continue with the existing oppressive system.
We do not believe to postpone the
not implemented Copenhagen Political Criteria for the period of accessions
negotiations. In this case, Turkey would be transferring all its problems
into the EU. Furthermore, such a decision would mean rewarding injustice,
racism and militarism.
The EU should not commit such a mistake.
SOUTHERN KURDISTAN (IRAQ)
The Kurds have for long been an
important driving force
By Taha
Barwary, Representative for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in
the Nordic Countries
Mr. Chairman
I would firstly like on behalf of
Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani, the KRG and myself to thank the organizers,
the Danish-Kurdish Council for arranging such an important conference.
I am honoured to stand here before you all as representative of the Kurdistan
Regional Government in the Nordic Countries and talk about my views on
the current situation in Iraq with focus on Iraqi Kurdistan.
The concept of free will is a key
when referring to the term “federalism”. The actual word federalism derives
from the Latin “foedus”, which means agreement or union. It is also believed
that federalism stems from the word “fides” meaning trust. The main objective
of federalism is therefore to assemble a group of individuals whose common
ground is based on mutual trust.
In the case of Iraq, its initial
formation was built on artificial grounds and its creation was dictated
by external forces and interests of power. Iraq was the consolidation between
several groups with religious and ethnic differences, but due to overlapping
authoritarian regimes, conflicts between these groups never arose. The
challenge now lies in ensuring that the transition from totalitarianism
to democracy does not give fuel to Iraq’s numerous groups and their taking
to violent measures in solving political differences.
The Kurds have for long been an
important driving force in this challenge. In 2002, for example, the Kurds
participated in the Iraqi opposition conference in London where federalism
was accepted for Iraq. Now, in an Iraq without Saddam Hussein the Kurds
are a powerful force with the ability to facilitate the unification process.
A reconciliation conference was also held in Iraqi Kurdistan, as a first
step in gathering different political, religious and ethnic groups in Iraq,
with the intention of creating consensus and cooperation.
The signing of the Transitional
Law of Administration on 8th March this year marks a true historic milestone
for all groups, not least the Kurds. The Kurdistan Regional Government
is for the first time officially recognized and the Kurdish language is
one of the country’s two official languages. The judicial system, internal
security issues and the control over the police force in Kurdistan remains
in the hands of the Kurdistan Regional Government, as well as the right
to veto federal laws. For the many Kurds that were deported during the
Ba'ath Party’s “Arabisation” programme, there will also be opportunities
to return to the areas of one’s own origin. This is an important issue
and Kurds are not satisfied with the steps that have been taken.
Iraq’s Transitional Administrative
Law is a strong compromise between several different parties and no one
has left the negotiation table without having to give up important key
questions. This fact should indeed give the groups a stronger incentive
to cooperate. The core of federalism is to combine a federal government
with the demand for local autonomy and decentralisation. In other words,
the creation of a union where the various group’s political, cultural and
social differences are preserved and not extinguished. It is important
to emphasise this issue time and time again.
The objective of federalism is to
combine the unifying thought with pluralism and local autonomy. For Iraq,
a federal political system is in fact, the country’s only means of survival,
presuming that all citizens have faith in it. Parallel to the Kurd’s faith
and our initiative for increased unification, it must be acknowledged,
that fear still remains amongst a vast majority of the Kurdish
population. There are after all still
no guarantees with regard to Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan’s future and to erase
the collective memory of the atrocities committed against the Kurds in
the past, is an impossibility.
The Ba’ath Party’s policy against
the Kurds was characterized by oppression, deportation and genocide, exemplified
by the brutal Anfal campaign which resulted in the deaths of 182 000 women,
children and men.
Since the 1960s the Ba’ath regime
tried to change the ethnic demography of Iraqi Kurdistan by transferring
Arabs from Southern Iraq to Kurdish areas. A part of this policy was to
confiscate property, destroy villages and cities and to deny and oppress
the Kurdish identity.
In 1991, the inhumane treatment of
the Kurds was enough even for the rest of the international community and
a free-zone was established for the Kurds. Iraqi Kurdistan became a safe
haven, which consequently lead to the establishment of a dynamic democratic
process which has been in the developing for the last 12 years. The Kurds
have succeed in establishing a society in which free elections have been
taken place, institutions established and legislations promoting democratic
reforms ratified.
This positive development in Iraqi
Kurdistan has also implied the increased hope for the Kurds in the surrounding
countries. The fact that the Kurds in Iraq are now recognized as a people
and that their government holds an official status in the constitution,
sends out a positive and hopeful message to them.
This optimism however, could and
has, backfired on the Kurds in these very same
countries. The responses from the
respective governments have not been encouraging in the fear that the Kurdish
efforts in Iraq will spread over to their own boarders. This can and has
resulted in harder oppressive measures against numerous Kurdish populations.
Currently there are intensive discussions
between UN, CPA and IGC regarding the shape of the transitional government
that will tack care of Iraq from 1st of July. There are real challenges
in front of us but we are hopeful to reach an agreement.
Finally, it is our hope that the
new Iraq will be based upon new democratic foundations and that the different
peoples of the country will be given the means to strive for their interests
in a democratic manner. The interests of all groups can and shall be heard
within the realm of acceptance and respect for difference. Here lies the
challenge. The different people of Iraq naturally have different views
on what constitutes an ideal future constitution, but we must all realize
that negations and compromise imply that there will be no clear winner.
Past atrocities against Kurds like notorious Anfal campaign, Halabja tragedy,
disappearance of 8000 Kurds from Barzan region and disappearance of close
to 8000 Faylee Kurds are in the fresh memory of the Kurds. New Federal
and democratic Iraq has to provide legal, constitutional and UN based guarantees
in order to create an Iraq where Kurds feel they are part of it.
It is urgent that the democratic
process moves forward in Iraq at this time and all support is welcome,
support that can in some way ensure the implementation of fundamental human
rights for all citizens in Iraq.
We are on the right track, but
it takes time
Intervention on behalf of the
Regional Government of Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah by Minister of Culture
Mr. Fattah Khalil Fattah, delivered by
Farhad Aziz
Mr. Chairman
Dear Participants
I hereby bring greetings from General
Secretary Mr. Jalal Talebani, Prime Minister Dr. Braham Sale and from our
Minister of Culture Mr. Fattah Khalil Fattah, who is also a leading party
member of The Labour-Taylor Party in Kurdistan. Finally I bring greetings
from our local government’s Labour and Social Minister Mrs. Sheno Ismail.
Mrs. Sheno and Mr. Fattah were supposed to have been here, but were prevented.
Due to security reasons they were not able to cross the boarder in Jordan,
and could therefore not be with us today.
On behalf of the Regional Government
of Kurdistan in Sulaymaniyah, and the PUK I thank you for your invitation
to the conference on May 26, 2004.
We from the Kurdish Government would
have been very pleased to take part in this conference, to meet its participants,
and have the opportunity to meet with Danish politicians. But unfortunately
we were not able to participate, because at the last moment we were prevented
from reaching your conference. Instead we send greetings from the Kurdish
people and commend you for your efforts to aid the Kurdish people’s situation.
It pleases us that throughout history
there has been, and continues to be good intentions, political forces,
and governments that support our fight for freedom and democracy. It is
a long process that we constantly work on. But we have finally succeeded
in becoming a country without an oppressing regime.
For the last 10-12 years the situation
in Iraqi Kurdistan has been such that our population living in Northern
Iraq have been under the protection of the Allied Forces in the socalled
Safety Zone. This has prevented Saddam Hussein’s regime from enforcing
its power on our population.
It was after the Golf War, when Saddam
Hussein’s regime was run out of Kuwait that the Iraqi people were finally
allowed to speak out and obtain Democracy. But unfortunately the regime
used its Special Forces to squash the people’s outcry and butchered them.
Approximately one million Kurds fled to the cold regions in the mountains
near the Turkish border. Consequently, as you know, the Safety Zone was
established to protect the Kurds.
Since then our people have been given
the opportunity to form their own local parliament through a democratic
election, and consequently formed its own local government when Saddam
Hussein withdrew his administration and ordered it back to Baghdad. It
was this historic event that made it possible for the Kurds to start the
democratic process. Unfortunately there was a downside; a discord arose
between the political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan. It was this factor along
with many others that caused the Civil War between the Kurds, which in
turn delayed our future democratic process.
Through goodwill and support from
the rest of the world concord reappeared, and a will to cooperate led to
stability in the region of Northern Iraq. Several projects were launched
to make up for the many years of neglect caused by the oppression of the
Iraqi government, and these have made life easier for the Kurdish population.
During many years we have worked
on several forms of development, for example rebuilding the country, which
in turn facilitatesthe development of a democratic social structure.
Together with the Allied Forces we
have gradually obtained freedom in Iraq after the fall of Hussein’s regime
on April 9th 2003. Along with the rest of the Iraqi population we are on
the path to stability and security in Iraq.
We have worked hard for our right
to be an independent people and we have attained much in our region. Throughout
it all we have been willing to cooperate with others in Iraq in order to
reach our goal; a democratic society built on a responsible Cabinet government
and referendum, in order to obtain a permanent rather than a temporary
constitution.
This is why we support the current
development in Iraq, which is based on the idea that the Iraqi population
should establish its own government in order to attain independence and
develop a constitution that respects Human Rights.
As we are a part of the future Federal
State in Iraq, we are obligated to respect Iraqi borders in regards to
our other neighbours. We therefore find ourselves in the balance between
our neighbourly obligations to countries such as Turkey, Iran, and Syria,
and showing our support to our brothers on the other side of the border.
In short a balance between brotherhood and neighbour-hood. We do not interfere
in our neighbour’s internal conflicts, but we are prepared to support the
disputing parties in solving their conflicts through dialog and negotiations.
We are on the right track, but it
takes time. We are dependent on everyone’s support in order to protect
Iraqi rights, and for development to continue on the right track. We must
therefore condemn torture and the violation of Human Rights.
Again we would like to thank you
for the invitation, and we continue to hope for a peaceful process to stability
for the entire region of the Middle East and Iraq.
Faylee-Kurds: An Issue of Re-Thinking
Dr. Akram
Hawas
Representing the Faylee Kurds'
General Council
I would like to thank the Danish
Parliament that offers us the opportunity to address our problems. And
from this place I would appreciate and express great thanks to Denmark
and the Danish People for receiving Kurdish and Faylee refugees.
I am here to present an issue, which
is not very known to the majority of Danes. The Faylee issue has not been
popularised in the political and academic arenas, although the Faylees
in effect form a great part of the Iraqi refugees in Denmark as well as
in all European and other Western countries that have received refugees
since the 1970s. That is primarily connected with the fact that the Faylees
used to present themselves as Kurds. There is no doubt that the Faylee
Issue has always been an integrated part of the Kurdish Question, but in
many ways the nature of the problems and the sufferings of the Faylees
have been long greater and deeper. While the Iraqi and the Kurdish refugees
suffered political oppression and statelessness the Faylees have also suffered
historic neglect, systematic deportation and sustained identity deprivation.
As a part of the Kurdish population
the Faylees have been the victims not only of the Saddam Hussein regime
but also and primarily of the process of nation and state building in the
Middle East in the aftermath of the First World War. The Faylees had played
a great role under the Islam state and earlier in the history of the Mesopotamia
as they were connected to the great religion of Zoroastrianism and the
historic Sassanite Empire whose influence extended long beyond the Mesopotamia
in the pre- Islam era. Now as a consequence of that undemocratic process
of nation-state, the Faylees have been marginalized in fragmented pariah
groups that lack essential cohesion.
Dear Chairman and Audience,
The Faylees, like the majority of
the Kurds were not pleased by this process that excluded them the right
to have their one state, but nevertheless they have played a great role,
both intellectually, politically and economic in Iraq and within the Kurdish
Nationalist Movement. While they have done that with great interest and
commitment, the Faylees and their territories in the East Iraq became arenas
of conflicts and bloody wars not only on the borders between the two new-establish
states of Iraq and Iran, but of wars of borders waged by all forms of nationalisms
and determinisms: between identities, historic and religious interpretations
and social divisions: between the Iraqi and Iranian influence, interests
and identity, between the Arabs and Iranians, the Arabs and the Kurds,
the Persians and the Kurds, between the Sunni and Shiite Islam, and so
between this or that political conflicting forces and not least between
the despotic state and society.
Being Shiite Kurds with specific
historic role and speaking a different Kurdish dialect no one of major
population groups would recognise the Faylees. They remained in modern
history a question of “others” for all partners. They were Kurds and Iranians
in the mind of the Arabs and general Iraqis. The Kurds considered them
as Shiites, Persian and Arabs, while the Iranians considered them as Arabs.
Most dramatically has been that the Iraqi state considered them as “the
enemies” of the national identity and interests. This made this powerless
and vulnerable social group a “legal” target for state operations.
Already by the very inauguration
of the state administration in Iraq a systemic process of devaluating the
Faylee areas and deporting groups of Faylees to Iran was initiated as if
it was an integrated part of the state regulation! Faylees were deported
in 1936, 1942, 1970 and finally and essentially effectively and tragically
in 1980-88. In the latter wave
of deportation that was connected
with the initiation of the Iraq-Iran war the Faylees paid a huge price
in blood, dignity and properties. About 300 000 Faylees were extracted
from their beds and thrown over the Iranian border in their night pyjamas
while their young men had been detained without any legal reasons. Iran
however did not consider them as Iranians, and so remained these Faylees
since that time and still living in a high miserable situation suffering
enormous social problems and degeneration.
The young detainees never came home
again and documents found after of the fall of the regime in April 2003
indicated that these were used in the Iraqi programmes and experiments
of the weapons of mass-destruction. This in effect is not the only fact
that gives the Faylees a specific status among the Kurds. The Faylee town
of Mandali was the first place where the politics of Arabisation of the
Kurdish areas was put into practice, while Faylees of Khaneqin and Mandali
were the first who experienced replacement, and the Faylee areas became
but ruins as they were formed the main frontiers under the Iran-Iraq war.
In the post-Saddam era, the great
parties, Kurdish and others went to the destructed Faylee areas surprisingly
not to help the people in re-constructing their homes, but ironically for
the purpose of political mobilisation to extend these parties’ influence.
On the other hand, all Faylee efforts to gain any respectable position
in the new Iraqi political structure have so far not been fruitful.
Dear Chairman,
Democracy and the respect of human
rights are the dreams of the majority of the all population in the Middle
East including the Kurds and the Faylees who suffered long from dictatorship.
It is quite understandable that a multi-party pluralism will offer much
better opportunities for all partners in these societies. But a real guarantee
for the survival of the minor social groups like the Faylees and others
may be seen in an intensive process of democratisation from below, socially,
culturally and psychologically. The Faylees have simply been neglected,
to borrow Hanna Arendt's conception, the “right to have rights”. Such an
essential problematique cannot be tackled by a top-down process. It needs
an act of culture that also addresses the relations within the structure
of the parties, ethnic, religious and whatever groups and forces as well
as the inter-relations.
The most successful democracy may
be the one that touches upon the life of the people, and the respect of
human rights may secure the choice of every individual and group. The Faylee
areas in East Iraq and the Faylee communities in Baghdad and elsewhere
have been characterised historically and traditionally by a high degree
of peaceful coexistence, where Shiite and Sunni Muslims, Arabs, Kurds,
Turkmen’s, Christians and Jews have lived together. The dream of the Faylees
is that such a culture of peaceful coexistence will prevail in the post-dictatorship
era.
The Faylees would ask the respectable
Danish Parliament and Government as well as the international community
the support in:
Granting the Faylees full Iraqi citizenship
and national identity and securing them positions in the new Iraqi political
structure;
Helping the Faylees in Iran to return
home, guaranteeing legal and economic compensation and reparation and granting
those who wish to stay in Iran Iranian citizenship and official residency;
Empowering the Faylee community
in general and offering economic and know-how aid to reconstruct and develop
the Faylee areas along the Iraqi-Iranian borders;
Including the Faylee areas into
the Kurdish territories and helping social rehabilitation and integration.
SOUTH-WESTERN KURDISTAN (SYRIA)
The Kurds in Syria: Spread Democracy
to enable
our Kurdish people to get its
legitimate national rights
By Ahmad
Mahmoud Cheto, Yekiti-Demokrat, Syria
Gracious attendants
First of all, I thank the brethren
in Danish-Kurdish Council for this graceful initiative that we as Kurds,
consider as an important support for the Kurdish and Kurdistan liberation
movement in general, and for the national Kurdish movement in Syria in
particular. This movement have been constantly looking for pulpits enabling
it to gaze over international arena, in order to shed some light on the
sufferings of Kurdish people in Syria, including the policy of discrimination,
suppression and deprivation varieties practiced against them. The policy
has resulted to a large extent in hindering their social, cultural and
political development, thus leading to state of despair and alienation
as well as generations of psychological disorder in the Kurdish personality
due to the imbalance between the duties that the Kurd carried out and the
rights that the Kurd were deprived of regularly. This is in addition to
the many discriminatory projects, laws, the state of emergency imposed
upon the Kurds in Syria. Makers of these discriminating projects and policies
cannot defend them, which is an expression of an odd state of a government
dealing with its citizens.
The unjust tally where the number
of its victims have exceeded today more than a quarter of a million individuals,
including people stripped of the nationality or considered unregistered
clandestine persons.
These are growing in number year
after year due to the natural increase of the population. Even authorities
in Syria cannot endorse the legality of this tally, but, since the subject
concerns the Kurds, thus this human tragedy is ignored, a thing that leads
to the migration of thousands of people to the inland towns and to European
countries, where they get citizenship after a due legal stay in the respective
country, while they are deprived of the citizenship in their homeland.
This is an odd contrast that makes one wonder about the nature of beneficiaries
from the continuation of such despising of man and the citizen’s rights.
The pertinacity of government leadership
in keeping the extraordinary tally law active
- particularly in the governorate of Hasakah/Al-Jezirah - that was initiated
by government decree no. 93 of 23 August 1962 upon which thousands of Kurdish
families were striped of citizenship under the pretence of an existing
Kurdish danger - represents a weak link in the chain of ethnic suppression
against the Kurdish people in Syria.
This law is also a strong discrimination
in terms of equality and the authority of law. This not only contradicts
international laws and declarations, but it is also in contradiction with
the texts of Syria’s permanent constitution in practice. Thus it
is the right and the duty of the Kurdish movement as well as the right
and the duty of all Syrian powers and forces, no matter position and affiliation,
to raise their voices for the abolition of this unjust law and for compensation
for its victims. This is a civic and humanitarian urgent duty that needs
the support of the international community in order to throw out this abnormal
case of treatment by a government of its citizens.
And then there is the issue of the
so-called Arabic belt that was applied in the beginning of the seventies,
where its makers exploited the issue of submerging some agricultural lands
under the waters of the artificial lake of the Euphrates Dam in the governorates
of Aleppo and Al-Rakkah, to move Arab farmers into the border region in
the governorate of Hasakah that was owned and cultivated by the Kurds,
their fathers and forefathers. The Syrian government helped the newly moved
Arab farmers by building model villages for them with all necessary facilities
and services. This resulted in a state of discontentment in this governorate.
Needless to say this act came in the framework of a discriminatory political
project that spoiled the national relationship and created barriers between
the citizens of our homeland. It caused serious injury to the national
loyalty of the Kurds. In addition it harmed the Syrian economy. Aside from
all these projects, the prejudice policies are applied in Kurdish regions
from “head to toe”: schools, employment, labour, etc. under the claim
of the danger to national security.
Historically, it is well known that
Kurdistan was first divided after the battle of Jaldiran between the Ottoman
and Safawid State in 1514. Later this was sealed by the agreement of Qasr-Shirin
in 1693. Then Ottoman occupied Kurdistan was further divided into 3 parts
by the Sykes-Picot-treaty. One of the parts was incorporated into the nascent
Syrian state, and accordingly Syria as a country was born with its existing
borders in compliance with the above treaty. This indicates that the citizens
of today’s Syria, whether Arabs, Kurds or other ethnic minorities were
united regardless of their wishes, and hence the new borders divided the
original nations (Arabs or Kurds) on the sides of the borders with neighbouring
countries. Consequently Syria becomes the homeland of many as a fortuitous
event.
While the Kurdish part tried to fortify
the unity of this country in exchange for its own social structure and
national human rights, an understanding was expected from the Arab part
for this fact and a respect for the natural rights of the Kurds. However,
the Arabs’ conduct expressed the logics of a suppressing majority that
exercised the annulment of whatever was non-Arab with the purpose of assimilating
the other nations, with the Kurds on the forefront. With the time passed
this outdistancing tendency by the successor regimes in the seats of power
intensified and damaged the concept of citizenship.
In this ambience, the Kurdish citizen
was requested to be as wanted by the propagandists of discrimination, Arabised,
striped of national individuality, or otherwise deprived of the national
rights, even to the extent of removal of the citizenship.
We as Kurds and Syrians find that
holding to the national and Syrian affiliation as a natural right that
would not curtail the Arabs’ self-esteem or their freedom in any way and
would not harm the Syrian interests. To the absolute contrary, it would
be adding a new colour to the national spectrum, leading to the beautification
of the national picture and it would lead to the enrichment of national
culture.
Instead of all Syrians being equal
to the law, no matter ethnic, religious, and sectarian affiliation, the
Kurds are all alike under the martial laws.
The Arabizing of the names of the
Kurdish villages and towns, as well as the names of nature sites and monuments;
even the names of the newborn are substituted with Arab names. This conduct
demolishes an important fundament of national unity and spreads an atmosphere
of distrust between the brethren of one nation.
The historical experiences of other
people have shown that national assimilation projects have never succeeded
and experiments of changing the national characteristics of any people
are doomed to fail. The changing of a Kurdish village name will not erase
it from memory, no matter the power and despotism of the Arabizers. This
is because the Kurdish name is implanted in the psyche and is transformed
into an important part of his life, a thing connected to his childhood
playgrounds. Thus preserving the Kurdish name is a national and civic duty.
Additionally, Kurdish students are
expelled from schools, colleges, and universities. Also workers are discharged
from their functions and jobs. Generally the Kurds are dispossessed of
rights to apply for diplomatic and military professions, as a continuation
of the fight against Kurdish culture and tradition.
This treatment facilitates a deep
fracture in social texture and leads to complications and tussles, with
unwanted results. This is due to the crystallization of different and contradictory
opinions both practically and scientifically, around the righteousness
and legality of the different national powers that form
the structure of the society. This
requires of all the acknowledgment of the existing facts, and the compliance
with hundreds of years’ old proceedings that assures the multiethnic structure
of the Syrian society: Arabs, Kurds, Sharks and others. All participated
in composing the history of the country so that it reached what it is today.
This means the clear and obvious recognition of the existence of the Kurdish
people as an organic part of the Syrian society. It also means the recognition
of the political struggle that should be solved based on legitimate national
rights such as citizenship, political, cultural, and social rights. Because
of the absence of a national democratic solution for the Kurdish issue
in Syria and the continuation of their stay in the shadow, there is an
increase of despair and perplexity in the national Kurdish front, which
in turn reinforces the risks of catastrophic results in the future.
The Kurdish people in Syria represent
11% of the Syrian population. The historical cohabitation of the Kurdish
people with their Arab brothers, from before the existence of Syrian state
in parts of the North of the so-called Bilad-al-Sham (the territory of
al-Sham) begging from “Ain-Diwar” in the North-Eastern part of the present
governorate of Hasakah/Al-Jezirah via the regions around Kobani,
Tel-Abyad in middle north of the country and to the north-western
corner in the Kurdag mountains around the town of Afrin, west of Aleppo.
This is in addition to the Kurdish communities in the towns of Hama, Damascus,
and Al-Raqah, and convinces us fully that the Kurds and the Arabs in Syria
are the basic constituents of the Syrian society and accordingly they should
have been partners in this country, working together for its strength and
development.
The Kurdish population in Syria exceeds
one million inhabitants, which is not only a majority in the North, but
also the second largest nation in the country. They are truly part and
parcel of the Syrian society. It is almost impossible for them to deny
their affinity and human and national self-respect, and being proud of
their mother-tongue, and their historic record adorned with many nationalistic
glorious deeds, which we will not discuss.
All the efforts to assimilate the
Kurds into the Arabic melting pot are in vain, and so are ignoring their
rights and national characteristics, as it would please some. Thus, there
is more than one bond that unites the Kurds and the Arabs in their fight
for a better future where the dignity of the citizens and the human rights
are protected as well as the legitimate rights of the Kurds in the framework
of the unity of the country and its civilizing development.
Gracious attendants
The chauvinistic policy carried
out against the Kurdish people is increasing in ferocity, in general as
a result of the developments we are witnessing in the region, and alongside
the background of the Iraqi situation, where many in the Arab arena of
national extremism have betted - and lost - on the regime of the dictator
Saddam Hussein as a symbol of Arab nationalism. The misjudgement has deepened
their sense of defeat. Instead of rationality and wisdom in analyzing the
causes of their failure, they are charging the Kurds in Iraq and the national
Kurdish extension in Syria with the responsibility of the defeat of the
dictatorship. Then came the decision regarding federalism as a governing
and organizational system in Iraq, and consequently all which means in
the shape the of accomplishment of the aspirations of the Kurdish people
in the Iraqi Kurdistan. With all this reflects of positive effects on the
Kurdish situation in Syria, it led to an increase of the chauvinistic hatred
of the Syrian regime and its determination to crush the national expectations
of the Kurdish people and to deter the patriotic Kurdish movement that
started to participate playing an active and important role in the internal
political movement and in the democratic activities witnessed in Damascus,
Aleppo and other Syrian towns. This presence included many sit-ins, where
different Syrian movements, organizations and social and political activists
participated demanding the introduction of democracy, and emancipation
of general freedoms, the respect of human rights, the release of political
detainees, the abolition of the more than 40 years state of emergency,
and finding a national democratic solution to the Kurdish issue.
As a result of this active Kurdish
movement, the organizers of the conspiracy of 12.03.2004 that started in
Qamushli wanted to suppress the Kurdish will to struggle and peaceful resistance.
This was clearly confirmed by impelling thousands of chauvinist minded
supporters of one of the sport clubs in the town of Deir-Alzor to carry
out provocative acts in the streets of the Kurdish town of Qamushli and
in the stadium. These acts included shouting out slogans hurting the Kurdish
national symbols, and glorifying the terrorist actions taking place in
Iraq. These acts were intended to exploit any Kurdish response for the
purpose of suppressing and quashing the Kurds. Hence the police and security
forces started firing live ammunition resulting in the murder of many innocent,
defenceless civilian Kurds and in injuring hundreds of individuals of the
Kurdish spectators. As a result of these events, the initially chronically
oppressed Kurdish public went into action because of the hated discriminatory
practices of the chauvinistic police, and their deep feelings of despair
of any just national solution, in all Kurdish regions starting with the
town of Qamushli. The martyrs were buried the day after, on the 13.03.2004,
by an immense demonstration where thousands participated. Again many were
murdered when security forces showered the angry demonstrators with live
bullets. This demonstration coincided with other sit-ins and demonstrations
covering all Kurdish towns (Amuda, Hasakah, Derbsia, Derik, Ras-Al-Ain,
Kobani, Afrin and Kurdish neighbourhoods in Damascus, Aleppo, etc.). But
instead of handling the situation wisely and responsibly the authorities
started to arm the Ba’thist Militia and encourage some Arab
tribes to attack Kurds and plunder their properties and houses, and murder
many more Kurdish citizens in the towns of Hasakah, Derik, Ras-Al-Ain,
Afrin etc.). Furthermore, the regime started a vast detaining campaign
that involved thousands, and the arrests were based only on being a Kurd.
Detainees were exposed to severe torture by a variety of methods resulting
in the death of three Kurds.
During the events all media were
mobilized in an attempt to connect the events in the Kurdish regions with
foreign involvement and separatist intentions. This was in order to generate
animosity in the Arabic quarters, hurt the Kurdish people and its political
movement, marginalize its role, provoke chauvinistic tendencies amongst
the Arabs and Kurds, generate the necessary excuses for the introduction
of martial law in the Kurdish regions, the prolongation of the state of
emergency, escape necessary changes and improvements, justification of
the policy of suppression and deprivation against the Kurds, and the general
policy of suppressing the Syrian public.
But the conspiring against the Kurds
in Syria failed in achieving its objectives and “the magic turned against
the magician”. The events confirmed the ability of our people to peaceful
resistance and its determination to assuring our legal national rights.
Thus it achieved practical recognition of its existence, which made the
policy of denial, repudiation of its rights and existence, and the deliberate
overlooking of the legitimacy of its movement impossible. These events
draw a map of the borders of the Kurdish regions and presence.
During these events all the Kurdish
fractions united against the conspiracy. Also all the political and social
forces in Syria and human rights committees, condemned the authorities’
“undervaluing of Kurdish blood” and their legitimization of killing the
Kurds. They also denounced the killing operations and requested
the appointment of an unbiased investigation committee to look into and
investigate causes and motives behind the actions. The treatment of the
prevailing state of congestion in the Kurdish environment was also demanded.
The national solidarity shown by the other parts of Kurdistan with the
peaceful opposition and endurance of our people, exhibited great support
and constituted new contributions in backing its fight.
Despite the recent stabilization
of the situation in the Kurdish regions, where the Kurdish movement played
a leading role – because of our understanding of the seriousness of the
conspiracy that was intended to lead the Kurds into a racial conflict,
the detaining operations, nightly raids and provocations by security forces
are still going on. There are still some one thousand detainees in the
prisons and many hundreds have been transferred to prisons in Damascus.
This shows the attempts of charging them with the responsibility for the
incidents and to expose them to partial judgments by the national supreme
security court, in order to destroy the spirit of our Kurdish people and
to restore the so-called respect of the state by the authorities. Respect
for the state cannot be established at the expense of people’s dignity
and Kurdish citizens’ rights, and by exercising of oppressive methods.
The circumstances in Syria are the
most dazzling examples of the framework of suppression and turmoil applied
by the authorities. The arrest of the Syrian human right activist, Aktham
Naisah only because he made public the death of some Kurdish detainees
under torture, revealed other cases of arrests. He was willing to address
the European Parliamentary Committee to discuss the Kurdish issue. In addition,
his quick transfer to the national security court in Damascus is an indication
of an improvisational and tense security policy that skips the needed political
solutions and the requirements of the wanted democratic improvement. Instead
of that the Syrian authorities present a dull alternative to the necessary
policy of wisdom and understanding in Syria.
The continued detention of comrade,
Mahmod Ali Mohammed (Abu-Sabir),a leading representative - who was arrested
upon his return from Iraqi Kurdistan, where he used a regular passport
happened during the extensive arrest campaign, involving thousands of Kurdish
people, including some of the leading figures of the Kurdish movement.
This detention is a manifestation of the oppression and intimidation used
as a substitute for dialogue and understanding – which is needed for finding
a just solution for the
second largest nation in the country
when dealing with the national Kurdish movement.
The regime can no longer continue
to practice a policy of denial, rejection and national supremacy detailed
in its general policy framework that is defined by the following points:
1. The Ba’ath party’s power control
monopoly in accordance with paragraph 8 of the Constitution that gives
the Ba’ath party the right to lead the government and the people.
2. Tightening the public’s freedoms
and the absence of an active role for the organization elected by popular
vote (parliament, association of trade unions etc.) that should express
the will of the people and defend their interests through representation
from fair and free elections. Another point is the absence of a law allowing
activities of political parties and associations. Also the continuation
of the martial state of law since 1963 and the total lack of independence
of courts of justice, arbitrary arrests and harassment of the intellectual
and political figures and persons with different opinions from those of
the government, under the cover of the emergency laws and the martial judgments
for more than 40 years.
3. The dependence on security force-solutions
in order to preserve provisional interests of one party. Avoiding opening
accumulated files of corruption in all directorates. The penalization of
accountability though silencing the voices. The absence of a free and independent
press that could throw light on concealed acts of failure and corruption
as well as illuminating the behaviour of officials.
4. The inability of the political
leadership to declare or adopt any initiative for a responsible national
reconciliation or to open a democratic dialogue to receive ideas and suggestions
– of which the Syrian public is full – to include all parts of political
and cultural organizations.
This would crystallize remedies to
public issues on the basis of principles and viewpoints of citizens so
that the gap between
the public and the elite politicians
of the governing party could be filled. And the continuation of security
enforcement and the tight clutching whenever a development or an international
or regional incidence appears on the horizon, and does not agree with the
way of thinking of the Ba’ath party, its principles and ideology. The real
danger is concealed in the persistence of the regime on continuing the
fall-back on the equation where depending on its arrogance and haughtiness,
it makes-believe that matters are running smoothly in the country.
In this context it is worth to mention
that the application of emergency laws and the martial courts for over
40 years, the absence of free and fair elections, the arbitrary arrests,
and gloominess of prisons have placed fear in the hearts of most of the
people and created a culture of horror which is dominating the public arena
where the whole country is turned into the land of fear and non-political
life.
Despite the above mentioned factors
and aspects, the Kurdish movement in Syria was and will stay playing a
tangible role, since it has the support of a public that believes in a
democratic national cause. A public that refuses the policies of Arabizing
and “Ba’athification” and looks forward to prevailing equality with others
via the abolition of discrimination and discriminatory segregation
between the Kurds and Arabs in Syria. A public that demands the use of
its mother-tongue, officially as well as the acknowledgment of its existence
and national characteristics through a constitutionally clear text distinguished
by civility and the spirit of cohabitation and amiability between variation
of cultures, away from the attitude of national and chauvinistic arrogance
that the Ba’ath party has been broadcasting for decades which made it almost
a general culture among milieus of the dominating nation.
The Kurdish movement urges a solution
to the national issue of our people. A solution that is nationwide and
democratic in the
framework of the protection of the
country’s unity and its civil development. We do believe that this solution
could be embodied in the application of self-rule of the Kurdish regions
so that the Kurdish people will be o run the affairs of their regions.
Thus they should be presented fairly in all government organizations without
exception as partners side by side with the Arabs and other minorities
in the Syrian population.
In vain the chauvinistic milieus
try, particularly the ideologists of the ruling Ba’ath party, to place
barriers between the Kurdish movement and the rest of the national democratic
organizations in Syria. In vain they classify the Syrian Kurdish organizations
as hostile and working to separate parts of the country in order to break
away. These milieus are working for the implantation of more doubts around
the Kurdish movement with the purpose of isolating it and singling it out
so that it could suggest to the Arab public opinion that there is a Kurdish
danger.
Based on this the Kurdish movement
is moving towards securing ties with democratic and social forces and organizations
- for the purpose of holding a general Syrian national meeting on
the basis of generating the needed changes to spread democracy and to enable
our Kurdish people to get its legitimate national rights.
Gracious attendants
The protection of human rights and
the guarantee of the rights of the people is no longer an internal duty
of this or that country. The experience has shown that its consequences
are reflected on all the humanity. The spreading of Kurdish migrants in
all European countries as victims of the discrimination, deprivation of
human rights in their original countries, is a very good example. The Kurds
that are suffering from alienation and oppression are looking forward for
help to force the Syrian government to discontinue its chauvinistic policies
and find a democratic solution for the Kurdish problem.
North of the “smaller” homeland,
Syria:
The dangerous peripheral geography
game
The Kurdish issue between strategy
and tactics
By Fateh
Mohammad Jamous, Human Rights champion – Syria
Awaiting the time where condition
will be more convenient for the success of wider and more humanitarian
and progressive “ultra-national” calls, coinciding with the “political
and ethical” future of free peoples within modern democratic systems, and
calling for establishing nations and central governments for nationalities
divided among several states (such as the Kurds and the Arabs)… or, wider
regional calls including more than one nationality… Or, international calls
of different types… Until that time, we want to say clearly and carefully
that we live in a small country that is part of a greater homeland … This
“smaller” homeland, called Syria, is now suffering many internal problems
that have complicated and taken the shape of a deadlock, for which the
authorities are mainly to be blamed because of its role in triggering and
aggravating the incident, and because it has always insisted on addressing
it with the same obsolete ways based on power monopoly, dictatorship, and
comprehensive oppression.
Meanwhile, this very homeland is
now the centre of American interests and is, even, a priority for the serious,
comprehensive, and offensive American strategy with its two-sided aims
that help America look like the “saviour” in the eyes of the regions population.
They call for “replacing the totalitarian oppressive regimes with democratic
ones, helping, thus, the region to get rid of its backwardness and catch
up with the advanced world through an economic, technical, social, political,
and cultural development project ! Apparently, these goals seem to be in
harmony with those of region’s peoples, including our Syrian people and
its democratic opposition movement. However, in depth, they reflect only
the American interests and the US new strategy for the region and the whole
world.
Building on a tyrannical, and even
totalitarian approach that has nothing to do with democracy dealing with
countries of the free world (especially Europe) or with the international
institutions, the American strategy is adopting a new and more dangerous
version of Machiavellianism, using the most non-ethical Machiavellian means
to achieve its real targets. It runs for wars, violence, and destruction,
and it is very intent on reshaping the Middle East, including our Syrian
homeland, by those monstrous means.
This approach looks archaic compared
with the European means, dealing with region (its regimes as well as civil
societies). European means, especially those of the elites, tend to be
democratic, humanitarian, principle-oriented and generally peaceful even
when it is a matter of supreme interests.
Due to present and future importance
of the American role inside Syria, especially as regards the Kurdish issue,
we shall try here to identify the real goals of this role:
Facing the Islamic tide and, particularly,
political Islam with its extremist and terrorist aspects. It is, rather,
a confrontation with Islam itself as a culture and civilization, under
the pretext that Islam and, hence, the region are sources of violence and
terrorism, and that the struggle now is against Islam after the declination
of nationalism and communism on the international level. The American administration
is highly exaggerating the political, ideological, and doctrinal sense
of this confrontation to use it to promote its domination. Doing so, the
US is entering an open confrontation with the region’s peoples due to its
means, stances and double-faced criteria as regards the Arabic issues,
especially the Palestinian issue.
Re-establishing the balance in favour
of the “Israeli entity” through rehabilitating, supporting, and strengthening
its project after it
has become exhausted, and has been
morally exposed and criticized due to its approach in fighting the Palestinian
people.
This has become especially important
because the active party in the Intifada is now
the Islamic groups (Hamas, Jihad
and the Islamic current in Fateh), supported by Syria (through its alliance
with Iran and Hezbollah) who is trying to strengthen the cards of the Syrian
regime, and the Syrian position as a whole, within its real contradiction
with “Israel”, whose obduracy is encouraged by the unlimited American support.
Controlling oil reserves, and assuming
political control over the regimes to ensure more domination as well as
economic and political control within the context of strategies’ clashes.
To achieve these goals, the American
administration has ignored the rest of the world... the more humanitarian
and ethical world, and rushed with its military forces, ready to pay whatever
costs, as is the case now in Iraq.
Within this dangerous interlacing
between national, internal and external conditions, the incidents took
place in northern Syria (Qamishli) spreading to other cities and towns
with significant Kurdish population. These events were of high tension
and danger.
What did actually happen? What were
the deep and core reasons? What is the real impact? Where does it
stand between the worsening internal crisis (almost deadlocked) and the
external strategies, mainly American, affecting the future and destiny
of our homeland?
1) Explaining what happened:
“I cannot sleep at night, because
I am anxious about my family and myself. I am afraid I might be killed.
I feel no security... the other is armed and might kill me… I need arms
to defend my family and myself, and I will try my best to have one”. This
clear and frequently repeated statement was one of the most dangerous things
we heard when
we went to Qamishli, a few days after
those events, as a party delegation accompanied by another delegation of
other civil society institutions (Committees for Civil
Society Revival and Human Rights
Society). Many Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians and Chaldeans
forming a wide sample of ordinary
citizens, have expressed similar feelings.
There were serious mutual accusations,
taken in as absolute truth, with every party accusing the other of obtaining
arms from its own resources or through cooperation and coordination with
a third party. Kurds (of all orientations) directly accused the authorities
of arming its own government organizations. They equally accused other
Arab activists of confiscating the licensed arms owned by Kurds. Kurds
also accused Arab tribal leaders of receiving larger quantities of sophisticated
arms.
On the other hand, the Arabs assured
the arrival of armed Kurdish individuals from outside Syria (Pesh Merga).
They stated that Kurds were receiving arms from abroad and that there were
huge quantities of arms in their, relating it to the American military
presence in Iraqi.
All of a sudden, each party formulated
a unified political discourse, terminology and even accent while accounting
for the reasons behind the events. In a word, frantic nationalist mobilization
had succeeded in creating pure contradictory polarization.
Moreover, extremist accusations dominated
the two sides. The Arabs accused the Kurds of coordinating and cooperating
with northern Iraq and the Americans in a separatist move. These accusations,
even, described Kurds as American agents, referring that there is a wide
plan, funded by external money, to buy Arab lands on behalf of Kurds, and
that there is a conspiracy to displace other minorities (Assyrians), always
suggesting some sort of connection with the most aggressive colonial project
(“Israel”).
On the other hand, Kurds referred
to a long history of injustice. They recalled details to show that their
cause is essentially national
one. They talked about the “Arabic
Zone” and its motives, about changing the names of Kurdish sites, the ever
worsening problem of denationalised Kurds, the absence of any cultural
rights, the intervention of security bodies, and the necessary approval
that is needed when Kurds want to possess land. The Kurdish discourse (especially
abroad) went even to using terms such as “settlements” and “settlers”.
Kurdish criticism went beyond the regime, accusing the democratic opposition
movement for its long ignorance to their cause, its defective approach,
and its nationalist attitude which is very similar to that of the regime’.
Both parties looked aggressively
ready to fight and die for their extremist goals, with each of them appearing
unified, stringent, and having a cause to defend… This was very clear on
the Kurdish side after the first episodes of the events, where very daring
and even, uncalculated violent acts were committed. In many towns, all
government facilities were destroyed. Slogans with extremist symbols were
raised, and in many cases this went far beyond the regime toward slogans
with anti-patriot content such as hailing certain American figures, burning
the Syrian flag, raising Kurdish and American flags and using the Kurdish
flag as a coffin in funerals.
The Arab tribal leaders said clearly
that they will fight any separatist tendency and any call for external
help; that they will do this all by themselves if the regime remained unaware
of such attempts, or was slow in reacting, or even if it tried to prevent
their intervention. Moreover, there were many looting actions in revenge
by both parties.
2) The importance of direct reasons:
Suppose that we take for granted
all mutual accusations, will they provide a suitable explanation of what
happened. On the other hand, it is very difficult if not impossible, to
prove the extremist accusations about a planned conspiracy. For example,
it is very
difficult to prove that the regime
had conspired to create a problem through a football game and a nationally
mobilized Arab audience, because the regime has no interest in such events
unless it was quite sure that the American threats were not serious giving
it a chance to run for Arab nationalist mobilization.
However, the American factor is not
under control and no one can be quite sure about
its limits and its flexibility in
executing the US threats and strategy. On the other hand, it is also difficult
to prove that the Kurdish side had prepared to create an explosive situation
through that football game.
Taking all details into account (the
level of mobilization, the propaganda, the unified discourse, the details
of cooperation with the Americans or other Kurdish parties in northern
Iraq, as well as other accusations made by Arabs about getting arms with
the intention to use them in sabotage actions, and the separatist slogans),
one cannot prove that the Kurds had intended to reach such a situation.
We think that the events started
as direct reactions on the background of deep, historical tension i.e.
on the deep nationalist bottom of each party with sufficiently mobilized
chauvinism. We think also that the local authorities acted within the same
frantic perspective and not through engaging in a well-prepared conspiracy.
Adding the culture of these systems
as part of the regime, it will be easy to understand the violent way they
used to deal with the situation, when they shoot and killed many people.
That bloodshed, in itself, undermined the possibility of stopping the explosion.
3) On the roots of the problem and
its main aspects:
First of all, it is the responsibility
of the regime with its frantic nationalist approach, its plans and practices
to re-export the Kurdish problem out of the country, and its refusal to
recognize this problem on the national level, considering it as a problem
of some immigrants, who have the right to be enthusiast
nationalists and to volunteer to
fight for their cause anywhere outside Syria, provided that there is an
agreement between the regime and external Kurdish parties, and that the
whole process is controlled by the Syrian security forces.
The regime frequently used this policy
toward Iraq and Turkey with the illusion of solving its own internal problem.
Later on, this has proved to accumulate and aggravate the problem when
Iraqi and Turkish parties adopted the same policy. In 1999, Turkish threats
to Syria were so serious that the regime found itself obliged to give many
concessions even on the national level to avoid a forthcoming war. Later,
it found it necessary to cooperate with Turkey to reduce the American and
Kurdish threats.
The Kurdish nationalist awareness
has been influenced by the national victories in neighbouring countries.
While thousands of Syrian Kurds volunteered to fight in those external
battles, they were quite aware of the Syrian dimension of their cause.
Part of them were also aware that Syria, contrary to Iraq and Turkey, does
not provide them with suitable geographical, political and population platform
to play a central role in their national movement. So, they considered
their participation to those external battles as an enhancement to their
nationalist awareness and training for their future work in Syria. This
awareness, however, did not stop them from taking a wrong step when they
gave priority to their national task at the expense of the central task
of the patriotic, democratic program.
Meanwhile, Arabic and Kurdish parties,
aware of the dangers of exporting the issues and who tried to prevent it
in the early 1980’s, were oppressed and banned by both the regime and the
PKK which was allowed to manage the affairs of the Kurdish region and did
so considering itself as the only Kurdish leadership.
Within this context, the Kurdish
issue has not developed self-dynamism or self-consciousness within the
opposition’s patriotic democratic program. Finally, the national Kurdish
political parties got back their freedom after the regime decision of ousting
“Abdullah Öcalan” and banning all PKK activities, as a result of immense
American-Turkish-Israeli pressure.
By that time (it was five years now),
many changes occurred at the international and regional levels: there was
the collapse of the Soviet Union that entailed many revisions and theoretical
and political reactions among leftist circles, including Kurds; there was
also a great victory for the other group lead-
by the US, accompanied with the
American ability to create comprehensive and deep effects that influenced
Kurds political calculations making them more pragmatic toward their national
task. This was encouraged, first by the unipolar American domination on
the world and the region as well as the direct American protection to the
Kurdish areas in Iraq and, finally, crowned with the occupation of Iraq
that gave Kurds concrete national feelings of victory and hopes that the
American factor will help them win their national battle.
This spread quickly among Syrian
Kurds due to the historical influence of the Kurdish leaderships of northern
Iraq, which had become, by that time, on bad terms with the Syrian regime
due to their coalition with the Americans, and begun seriously to work
on the Kurdish issue in Syria.
The oppressive role of Arab regimes,
the history of their relation with their peoples and their oppositions,
as well as their efforts to maintain their own interests, all that has
made the Arab nationalist movement, with its different orientations and
ideological backgrounds, recess and retreat leaving the arena to the religious
current and allowing it to look like acting on behalf of everybody.
On the contrary, the Kurdish situation
is now witnessing a real development in terms of the high tide of nationalist
awareness, though the Kurds are divided among several states and lack a
unified strategy. This tide contradicts the situation of the Arab nationalist
movement in context, direction and content. All that has contributed, and
will contribute to creating a deep, widespread feeling of animosity toward
the American administration among Arabs, especially Muslims.
There is also a feeling that the
Kurdish nationalist movement depends on the American administration, allying
with it or, at least, getting strength through it. Large circles of the
Arabic political opposition figures think that certain organized Kurdish
forces (especially the mainstream which is the most powerful) are trying
to give priority to their national cause in any patriotic democ-
ratic program. Arabs feel also that
Kurds were happy with what happened in Iraq, seeking revenge in seeing
bad things going at the expense of the defeated, frustrated, and retreating
Arab nationalist movement.
Arabs feel also that the Kurdish
issue will represent a crack in the Arab nationalist efforts as well as
in the patriotic democratic activity both in Syria and Iraq.
For a long time, the attitude of
the Arabic democratic opposition in Syria was not much better than the
regime’s, as regards potions toward the Kurdish issue. There was a defective,
conservative and even chauvinist approach that has not considered the Kurdish
issue within the same theoretical, political, and ethical criteria it used
while dealing with the Arab national issue.
Historically, the Arab opposition
has always dealt with the Kurdish issue merely as a problem of about 200,000
denationalized Kurds, in addition to the lack of some cultural rights.
Within the last four years of democratic dynamism in Syria, no significant
convergence has been made between the two poles (Arabs and Kurds) of the
democratic opposition, even at the lowest level. However, such convergence
was not achieved even within the Arab spectrum. Therefore, the Kurdish
side stuck to its essential criticisms and focused on its national task,
i. e. it stayed out the Syrian democratic action.
The recent explosive situation showed
how defective the Arab opposition stands. It showed also the weak relation
and cooperation between both sides of opposition, unveiling both extremist
faces of the issue: the
Arabs were unable to recognize the
Kurdish issue as a national cause and to integrate it
in the patriotic democratic program
as it should be, and the Kurds stepped away from the Syrian democratic
opposition context, focusing impatiently only on the Kurdish issue as if
saying to Arabs: “we can no longer wait until you understand our cause,
the condition are suitable for us and we might lose our opportunity”.
4) Illusions and mistaken attitudes
we should deal cautiously with:
The first serious illusion comes
from the regime’s part, after knowing how dangerous the incidents are and
what the real deep reasons of the problem are in terms of their correlation
with the internal crisis on one hand and the outside, threatening factors
and assumptions on the other (America .. etc.). The regime might have thought
it impossible to re-export the issue ... it might now have an impression
that most of the Kurdish parties have betrayed it by their long-term pragmatic
behaviour, and by building alliances with other parties without feeling
grateful to the regime for the different facilities it had offered to them,
especially in terms of logistic support allowing Syrian Kurds to fight
in Turkey and northern Iraq.
Such an illusion would be fatal if
the regime returned to the idea that security and oppressive approach can
solve the problem. This would encourage the Kurdish movement to depend
openly on the outside (the Americans), increase its reliance on its historic
leadership in northern Iraq and widen the scope of its demand mingling
between strategic and provisional issues and showing readiness to fight
to death supporting these issues. This will never help the process of disarming
the American arguments.
The Syrian regime has undoubtedly
tried to read the lessons of the past as well as those of the last incidents,
which was clearly demonstrated in the President’s interview with Al-Jazeera
TV, a short while ago, when he ruled out the responsibility of external
factors and, for the first time in the regime’s history (esp. the Ba’thist
regime), addressed the Kurdish issue as the existence of another specific
nationality in Syria.
Apart from the details about the
historic national integration, the President’s attitude seemed far better
than that of many democratic groups in the opposition, at least at the
theoretical level. He promised to solve to citizenship problem, which created
a widespread feeling of relief among the Kurds at all levels (political
parties as well as normal people). However, it also created confusion and
primitive divisions among the organised Kurdish forces towards the democratic
opposition to the regime, which might push some of them to revive their
past pro-regime positions, unless they have developed the core attitude
towards the Kurdish issue and improve coordination among each other.
The new position, as expressed by
the Syrian president is positive in general. It included something daring
compared with past attitudes. However, we think that it was based on a
pragmatic background, and came at a time when the regime is still monopolizing
the power, showing comprehensive oppression and ignoring the role of other
social forces in addressing the nation’s crises including the latest blast
(its reasons, impact and risks as well as its possible repetition in the
future, in the absence of the right democratic solution). In addition,
it is not enough to give announcements, while the security forces still
have full freedom in dealing with the situation.
The second dangerous illusion come
from the Kurdish side, who wrongly compare the Syrian case with what is
happening in Iraq in terms of internal and external (American) conditions.
This means that it is the right timing now to act independently away from
the Syrian democratic movement – that is away from its problems and drawbacks
– to focus on realizing new achievements on behalf of the Kurdish cause.
In fact, the two cases (Iraq and
Syria) are very different in terms of the regime’s attitude towards the
Kurdish issue and towards the democratic movement, and also in terms of
the level of irrationality and oppression. The Iraqi regime represented
the ugliest example of dictatorship, bloody violence and irrationalism
especially when dealing with the Kurds. The Syrian case is relatively different,
and such relativity is very significant even when we take into consideration
that the Syrian regime still maintains its dictatorial aspects and comprehensive
oppression.
The Kurdish issue can hardly be compared
to that of Iraq. Syrian Kurds are not victims ready to revolt, as pictured
by certain media. Moreover, there is a widespread belief, among the Arabic
democratic opposition in Syria, that the most politically active Kurdish
parties had done nothing towards the long-term oppression by the Syrian
authorities against this opposition. On the contrary, these parties were
the fondled son of the regime. They helped it re-export the problem and
even suppress certain Arabic opposition groups such as our party (Communist
Labour Party) as well as some Kurdish groups during the period (1986-1987).
The obligatory opening of the regime
under different pressures (internal crisis and the need to adapt and reproduce
itself, and external pressure), and the deep conviction that it is impossible
now to return to past approaches, such as physical oppression, has enabled
different Syrian opposition groups to choose the open, peaceful and gradual
democratic activity as a decisive option.
Now, if we add other factors such
as: the radical attitude of this opposition towards the US interference
in Machiavelli methods and the dual approach in nationalist issues; the
contradiction between the US and Turkey on the Kurdish issue (which is
unanimously considered a red line by the Turks, even among Islamic groups);
the last developments in Iraq which are not in the favour of the American
occupation, we realize that the illusive comparison between Syria and Iraq
is a fatal error, not only at the theoretical level but on earth as well,
especially when we take into consideration the specific details of the
Kurdish community in Syria (compared to those in Iraq, Turkey and Iran)
in terms of demography (smaller number) and geography (discontinuity in
location and smaller area) and weak environmental variety.
All this block the possibility of
turning the Syrian Kurds into a strategic focal point for their nationals
or a detonating trigger for the
Kurdish cause. They will rather
remain reactive to what is going on in other Kurdish communities in the
surrounding countries.
Even in the case of direct American
interference in the shape of occupation or creation of an altitude line
similar to what happened in Iraq, such an illusion will lead to explosive
nationalist tension between Arabs and Kurds not with the regimes.
Even if the American administration
decided to burn its boats and take the risk of establishing a semi-state
entity in northern Iraq, the situation in Syria would remain far different,
and the Kurdish zone would be crushed under the Arab nationalist pressure
and because of the American intention to use it just as a spark... as an
experimental tool... and as a pretext for direct intervention. In this
scenario, the human tragedy would be colossal indeed.
The best alternative for all Syrian
Kurds, in my opinion, is to relinquish all hopes/illusions as regards whatever
external factors, and commit themselves to the democratic opposition movement
by providing full support to promote this movement and help it get rid
of its weaknesses, now that there is a real chance to do so.
The only result, if the above-mentioned
Kurdish illusions went on, is to push the Syrian authority to stick to
its own illusions that it can solve all problems alone and with obsolete
approaches. This will help the regime isolate and besiege the Kurdish movement
in Syria and mobilize all fundamental nationalist groups against it, which
will only block the way of the democratic opposition and prevent it from
facing the internal democratic challenge peacefully and publicly, and that
is what the regime is already blocking with its nature, behaviour and adaptive
methods. It will equally prevent this movement from facing the external
challenges, against which the regime is still depending on its archaic
tools in terms of ignoring the society and its democratic forces, the matter
that double the risk behind these challenges.
The third lethal illusion is that
of the Arabic democratic opposition, which believes that its concepts,
beliefs and attitudes as well as what it has offered to the Kurdish cause,
constitute the right solution. Lessons from the latest explosive incidents
as well as certain discussions held here and there; show that the Syrian
opposition attitude is not sufficient. It does not represent a real break
off with the regime’s approach as regards the Kurdish issue. Moreover,
the regime itself has, in its last attitude, surpassed the attitude of
many opposition groups.
It is urgent now to abandon all conservative,
narrow-minded, chauvinist and pragmatic views (adopted mainly to cherish
the Arabic masses). We should attract the attention against another illusion,
though very limited, which builds on revengeful basis as regards the political
relation with the regime, by trying to encourage the Kurds to repeat the
incidents and encourage the Arabic groups to follow the Kurds who are “strong
enough and has external support .. They constitute the spearhead of a democratic
movement... not a wrong separatist movement”!
Solutions and action programs
We now see how important our view,
(formulated in the Strategic Guides since 1976), was towards minority issues,
especially the Kurdish issue. This view was rightful, exact and pioneer
from the democratic and nationalist point of view. It was based on recognizing
that the Kurdish issue is indigenous in Syria. It is a strategic and organic
component of the original Kurdish issue as a whole, which stipulated that
the Kurds form one nation, divided among four countries as a result of
the colonialist interests and agreements at the beginning of the 20th century,
exactly as was the case with our Arab national issue and countries.
We feel now that our past attitude
was far from hypocrisy and dualism in standards between the two issues
(Arabic & Kurdish)... far from fundamentalism and chauvinism. It was
based on the right of the Kurdish people and Kurdish nation to build an
independent Kurdistan with its central power... the right of self-determination
for the Kurdish people. We believe that this attitude is still valid as
a strategic foundation to solve the Kurdish problem... a moral, humanitarian,
democratic and contemporary foundation.
There are a Kurdish people, and it
is a part of the Kurdish nation. This should be a key component of any
democratic program for the Syrian opposition. It will open the door for
all Kurdish groups to actively participate in the democratic struggle of
this opposition without any barriers. It will strengthen the national and
social integrity.
However, since it is a strategic
approach, it is expected to face many obstacles with many tasks still to
be realized, and the first among these tasks is to establish real democratic
regimes in the four countries, which allow ending nationalist tension and
contradictions, and concluding a civilized democratic accord that will
encourage integral unity... or free divorce.
One of the factors that account for
the huge price we paid, in terms of the cruel accusations and harsh imprisonment
sentences imposed by the regime, was because of our attitude towards the
Kurdish issue. This high price revealed how important such an attitude
was, even by the regime that has already made certain changes on its own
attitude.
A clear strategic view by the Arabic
side would disarm the external factor (the American claims)... would block
all kinds of nationalist chauvinism, hence getting the whole issue back
on course.
The Kurdish movement (people as well
as political parties) should join the program of the Syrian democratic
opposition, with its tools and ways of action, and try to promote this
program.
On the other side, the Arabic democratic
opposition movement should abandon its past attitude, by carrying out a
serious historic and demographic study to replace its weak attitude which
did not deal seriously enough with the Kurdish issue. The most important
step in this regard is to formulate a clear national and democratic program
which takes the Kurdish issue into account, by defining its importance
and priority level. In this case we will have one program and one central
mission, with the other specific tasks ranging according to their objective/subjective
presence in the movement of contradictions and democratic action. The opposition
attitude here is very important and crucial, provided we benefit from our
experience in dealing with the regime and its expected attitudes.
In addition to recognizing the Kurdish
issue as an indigenous national cause, not just a problem of certain emigrants
or citizens like Arabs with no specificity whatsoever... in addition to
locating the Kurdish issue in the right place within the democratic program
.. There are a number of provisional demands, which need clear formulation,
dissemination and efforts to be realized, such as the citizenship problem,
the official recognition of the Kurdish nationality as well as other indigenous
nationality on the Syrian homeland (Assyrians, Chaldeans), the recognition
of the cultural rights with the immediate stop of all sorts of national
discrimination against the Kurds.
Only with such an approach could
we go ahead with our democratic struggle, to eliminate the power monopoly
peacefully, gradually and publicly... to establish a modern democratic
system for the whole society and to open a democratic course to solve the
Kurdish problem.
The Reality of the Kurdish Situation
in Syria
By Abdulbaset
Sieda, Writer
There are no official figures in
regard to the exact number of Kurd’s in Syria as no census based on ethnicity
has taken place and the Syrian constitution only acknowledges the presence
of Arab citizens. In accordance with the existing law every citizens is
an Arab first and a Syrian second.
As security forces often conduct
what they call “research” concerning the Kurds they must have a fair idea
about their number but the results are kept secret and are not available
to researchers. There are, however, estimates and according to figures
gathered by Kurdish political organisations the Kurds of Syria number more
than two million. Of these one and half million are estimated to
be dwelling in the three Kurdish district: about one million are in AL-
Jazeera district, about 200 000 in the district of Kobani (Ain el- Arab)
and around 350 000 in the district of Afrin and the surrounding areas.
The other million inhabit various Syrian cities, including Damascus and
Aleppo (around 300 000 in each). There may be an additional 100 000 Syrian
Kurds living abroad, in Lebanon, Europe, USA, Canada, Australia….
Kurdish is the mother tongue of the
Kurds in Syrian Kurdistan and it is the language spoken at home by children
until they are taught Arabic which is the only official language in Syria.
About 96% of the Kurds in Syrian
Kurdistan are Moslem. The remaining 4% or so are mainly Yezidis followed
by Christians. There is not religious prejudice or conflict amongst The
Kurdish community. Moslem Kurds respect the followers of the other
religions whether Kurds or non Kurds and there has always been good relations
and mutual respect between Kurds and Christians in Syrian Kurdistan
despite attempts by Syrian intelligence and the official governing party
to create division. The wisdom of the leaders on both sides have prevented
these from reaching their aims as both Kurds and non Kurdish Christians
are aware of the intentions and know living together in harmony requires
respect and understanding.
The Kurdish people in Syrian Kurdistan
are subjected to dual oppression. On one hand they are deprived of their
legitimate democratic rights and on the other they are discriminated against
in various ways because there is an attempt to wipe out their Kurdish identity.
As a Kurd one is not allowed to democratically express his/her identity,
nor does one enjoy the cultural rights, including education in one’s native
tongue. This deprivation also includes lack of real participation in social,
administrative, economical and political processes in the country.
The other face of oppression mentioned
above is embodied in the procedures aiming at the annihilation of the Kurds
as a people of distinct national characteristics. These oppressive procedures
that aim at ensuring an anti- Kurdish political system are included in
various practices including;
1- Reducing the number of Kurdish
people in any way possible. An example of this is the so called extraordinary
census in the district of Al- Hasaka in 1962 as a result of which more
than 200 000 Kurdish citizens were deprived of Syrian citizenship.
2- Confiscating as much land in
the Kurdish areas as possible in order to re- inhabit these areas with
Arabs and gradually impose assimilation on the Kurds. Tens of Arab villages
have been established, especially in Al-Jazeera district bordering Turkey
in order to separate the Kurds in Syrian from the Kurds in Turkey. The
establishment of than 40 village on the land of confiscated by the Syrian
government in the district of Al- Jazeera as result of ”The Arabic Belt"
Project is an example of this severe plan.
3- The implementation of economical
hardship aiming at making Kurds continuously concerned about the way to
make a living. This can be
seen through the continuous intermingling by security forces into activities
related to private economical activities be it in the field of agriculture,
trade or industry. Discrimination and corruption are also embodied in the
areas of employment. The practice of corruption within the public sector
and bribery demanded by public servant in the Kurdish areas is very well
known.
4- Keeping Kurdish areas backward
in very respect. One of the aims of this is to disadvantage these areas
economically of course. These areas which are Syria’s sources of oil, water
and food are not only looted but also subjected to planned negligence.
One example of this is the absence of economical projects planned by the
government resulting in devastating unemployment amongst the inhabitants
of Kurdish regions. Furthermore, the Syrian authorities continuously aim
at creating various disputes in these regions while at the same time endeavouring
to keep the tribal sprit alive in order to create holes within the social
fabric of local communities and use them for their advantage whenever required.
5- Destruction of Kurdish cultural
identity by pursuing a policy of Arabisation, including the names of towns,
villages, businesses and newly born children. This in addition to the Kurdish
language not being officially recognised and not allowed to be used in
schools and government offices.
Kurdish culture is also oppressed
through the policy of banning the printing and publication of books, newspapers
and magazines in Kurdish and by not giving the Kurdish language a place
in the media that is dominated and controlled by the government. In order
to grasp the ideological background of the oppressive policies in regard
to the Kurds it is important to have a glance at the ideology of
the Arab Ba’ath party that came to power through a military coup in 1963
and has been ruling Syria ever since.
The constitution of the Ba’ath party
does not mention the existence of any nationality other than Arab in Syria
which is considers a part of Arab land regardless of the historical and
archaeological background of the area. This ideology indeed denies the
existence of any other nationalities but Arab in any part of what is today
known as the Arab World. Clause seven of the party’s constitution states:
“The Arab homeland is that part of
land inhabited by the members of the Arabic nation. It is the land located
between the Taurus Mountains, Bishtkweh mountains, the Gulf of Basra, the
Arabic Sea, the Great Desert, the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean.”
It becomes clear from this part of
the Ba’ath Party’s constitution that it does not recognise the presence
of non Arab land or people within the defined borders. But even the writes
of this words seem to have known at the reality is different from what
they claim. Thus they emphasise in clause eleven of the same constitution
that “any person who calls for racial differences or joins a racist group
against the Arabs or immigrates to the Arab homeland whit colonial aims
in mind shall be deported from the Arabic land.”
Thus the Ba’ath Party uses its own
constitution to legitimise the policies of deporting other ethnic groups
and minorities that may one day claim the right to the lands the party
considers to be Arab land.
The above mentioned policies and
practices in addition to various kinds of abuse the Kurdish People are
subjected to daily were indeed the real cause of the events that began
in Kurdish areas on 12 March 2004. They were not due to the disturbances
occurring during a football match as claimed by the Syrian official media
but resulted from what has been accumulating for tens of years. The Syrian
President Beshar el- Esed himself acknowledged during an interview with
Al-Jazeera TV on 1 May 2004 the event that followed had national characteristics.
He also indicated there was not foreign hand in the event, a claim earlier
made by Syrian officials of various levels.
The events in March affected all
Kurdish regions without exception and spread to larger cities with Kurdish
communities, especially Damascus and Aleppo. They were echoed all over
the world wherever Syrian Kurds could be found. This by itself is proof
there is a Kurdish question in Syria that requires a solution, a solution
that includes an official recognition of such question as a first
step leading to the recognition of Kurdish people and land within Syria.
It must be said that what the Syrian President said lately is an the objective
recognition of the Kurdish question in Syria is a serious beginning step
in solving the Kurdish issue on a democratic basis that respects plurality
and differences within a broader national Syrian unity, a unity that takes
into consideration the various characteristics of the groups that together
make Syrian society.
The current situation in the entire
region remains filled with uncertainty. Unfortunately the Kurds of Syria
represent a weaker link within the political status qua of Syrian society
something that could result in them becoming a scapegoat at a time when
the authorities are endeavouring to find a way to calm the public and a
time the martial law as fist step towards democratic and fair elections
that could lead to the formation of a legitimate government.
Many challenges and risks lie ahead.
Therefore there is a need for international pressure through human rights
organisations. The European Union which has economical and political ties
with Syria can play an important role in chancing the Syrian authorities
dealing with the citizens of Syria in general and the Kurdish population
in particular. One also hopes the United Nations can play a role consistent
with its humanitarian role reflected trough its laws and programs. The
suffering of Kurdish children, women and the elderly is no doubt a concern
to UN organisations.
The Kurdish question should not be
looked at as a merely internal matter. It is a part of regional problem
that has occurred following World War one that led to consequences continuing
in the region today. Therefore there is a need for concentrated efforts
from all sides capable of playing a role in this field in order to put
an end to the suffering of the Kurdish people and to secure the recognition
of their legitimate national and democratic rights, the sort of rights
that are taken for granted in today’s civilised world.
EASTERN KURDISTAN (IRAN)
Iranian Kurdistan from a Closed
Gate to a Brighter Future
By Abdoulmajid
Hakki,
Representative of the Democratic
Party of Iranian Kurdistan
As long ago as 10 - 15 years, we
Kurds used to say: "Kurds have no friends but mountains." Today in the
light of information revolution we can fortunately say the Kurdish expression
is part of last history. Organising such conference and other events on
Kurds and Kurdistan World wide give us the belief that mountains are only
one of Kurdish friends. Today International community is closer to Kurdish
questions that any time before in the past history. We now believe without
a democratic and just solution for Kurdish question the Middle East and
especially those countries that divide Kurdistan are far from peace, security
and economic and political development.
The division of Kurdistan in four
countries, with different political, social and economical cultures and
their impact on the international political development has caused four
different situations for Kurdish question, which seek diverse approach
and at the same time in parallel to solve the question. In this debate
we will concentrate on Iranian Kurdistan and the Kurdish question in Iran.
The far and near history of Iran
includes various well known occurrences for Kurdish people. The Plateau
of Iran and her civilisations are known for us. The region has been witnessed
numerous of civilisations conflict. Since the creation of new Iran under
Reza Pahlavi leadership the strategy of Iranian rulers have been to assimilate
and dissolute other ethnic minorities under the name of creation Grate
Iranian civilisation. The aim of Pahlavis` was to make Iran a country of
one nation, one language and one culture whom name is Persia. Kurds, Azeris,
Arabs, Baluchs and Turkmens were the main victim of national deprivation.
The outcome was the fundamental changes in the regional and administrative
structure. Various villages, cities and lands lost their historic and real
names and they were given a forges identity. It was shame to be a Kurd
in Pahlavi's period. Kurd meant in Pahlevi's culture a person with no culture,
history and civilisation, who lives in mountains. Kurdish name was in the
Pahlavi point of view people with no sense of human being and who is wild.
Civilisations meant to dissolve the Persian identity.
Since the creation of the Islamic
republic of Iran, the Iranian regime continues ethnic cleaning under the
name of "political Islam". Since the formation of Islamic republic has
caused tens of thousands civilian death, thousands of civil death, thousands
of civil people have been executed, hundreds of Kurdish villages and cities
have been destroyed and their inhabit have been refugees in their homeland.
The Islamic republic has explored
its war against Kurdish people from military action, economic, cultural
and political war to internal and international terrorism. Since late 80s
over 300 Kurdish opposition groups´ members are assassinated by Iranian
regime in Iraq, Turkey and EU. The assassination of Dr. Abdolrahman Ghasemlou
the general secretary of Kurdistan Democratic Party, by Iranian diplomat-terrorist
in July 13th 1989 on peace negotiation table and Dr. Sadegh Sharafkandi
and his comrades in September 17th 1992 who were assassinated by Iranian
regimes terrorists in Germany Berlin are Iran’s regime crime examples.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party of
Iran still believes in peaceful solution. We believe that finding a just
solution for Kurdish question will help the democratisation process of
the region.
Dear Friends,
The world after September 11th and
the international war against terrorism have brought changes in Meddle
East. The destruction of Taliban and Saddam regimes by coalition forces
has brought new era in the region including inside Iran itself. Today’s
regional and international situation demands Iran to integrate herself
with process of globalisation.
As long as it concerns to Islamic
Republic of Iran the regime can not integrate with Globalisation and be
part of democratic process of the region. The constitution of Iran is based
on Velayate Faghih the representative of God on earth, who God has given
the role of ruling people. The economic structure of Iranian Regime is
a combination of 1400 years old formulates former Soviet economical model
and tightly controlled market. The Iranian citizens are prohibited to access
to satellite, internet and other information channels, as preface of the
information society.
1. In the Kurdish struggle point
of view, Iran can join the globalisation process and be a member of International
society id she:
2. Acknowledge Iran as a multi ethnic
country with different culture, history and richness of Iran’s culture
and civilisations.
3. The sovereignty of ethnic groups
and individuals is a vital part of constitution of the country.
4. Over 10 million of Kurdish people
live in Iran. In addition there are five other ethnic groups living within
Iran: Azeri, Arabs, Balouch, Turkmens and Persian. The ideal solution for
ethic question in Iran is a Federal system based on the geographic, historic,
economic and cultural aspects of the country’s ethnic groups. In the other
hand recognising autonomy rights for Iranian Kurdistan, which is our Party’s
choice for Kurdish question, will give the possibility to Kurdish people
as first class citizens in Iran to participate in the country’s development
and bring a new opportunities to join the international community and be
active democratisation process in the region.
At least not at last, the Democratic
party of Iranian Kurdistan call all International organisations specially
the government of Denmark as a member of United Nation to support Iran
to fulfil its obligation towards its people and respect their cultural,
social, economical and intellectual rights according to United Nations
39/11 12.11.1984, 47/135 18/12 1992 and 306/1990 HE resolutions and UNESCO
Declaration on 4.11.1966.
A Brief View on Human Rights
Situation in Iranian Kurdistan
By Jahanbakhs
Khaledi, Kurdistan Peace Committee
I would like to thank you for giving
me this opportunity to give brief information on the human rights situation
in Iranian Kurdistan. Regrettably due to the limit of time and the long
list of violations of Iranian regime against Kurdish People it is not possible
to overview all aspects of human rights situation in Iranian Kurdistan.
However I believe this short presentation will give some information on
the reality of Kurdistan in Iran:
The constitution of every country
is the first measurement of the value of human being for the ruler of a
country. As we witness in the Europe and democratic countries all governments
action are measured by law. The illegality of government is observed governmental
and NGO’s. The constitution of Islamic republic of Iran as the philosophy
of the Islamic regime is full discrimination and injustice towards Iranian
citizens and its ethnic groups.
According to the fifth, fifty seventh
and hundred and seventh articles of Islamic republic constitution the highest
institution of the government is supreme leader of the Islamic republic
who is a male person who according to constitutions twelfth article must
be Shiite cleric. According to the constitution of Iran, the president,
ministers and Parliament spokesman must belong to the Shiite religion.
Over ten million Kurdish people live
in Iran. The majority of them are Sunni Muslims, who according to constitution
are second class citizens. The Iranian women who consist half of society
have no rights to participate in the political rule.
The punishment law of the Islamic
Republic of Iran gives yet a better picture of the refgime towards opposition
groups:
According to the 198-211 paragraph
of the retaliation and punishment of Iran, those individuals who work against
Islamic republic of Iran and support the opposition groups are classified
as evils whose punishment are
1. To be killed;
2. To be hanged;
3. His right hand and left foot
to be cut; or
4. To be exiled. During exile the
first three days he has to be tied. After that, if he is alive he has suffered
his punishment. He has no right to contact any one and has no right to
travel.
The above introduction shows the
reality of the Islamic republic of Iran and makes clear its attitude towards
Kurdish people.
Last year Iran was the second after
China with the highest number of civil executions. Furthermore tens of
Kurdish political prisoners and civilians are killed in secret. From January
first 2004 up to now over 40 Kurdish civilian people have been killed by
security guards of the Islamic republic. During the Newroz - Kurdish New
Year feasts over 500 Kurdish people from Sanandaj, Saghez, Marivan, Piranshahr,
Baneh, Urmie and Sardasht were arrested from whom the fate of 130 persons
is still unknown.
According to the press release of
KDPI' Politburo on October 19th 1996 seven members of the Party were kidnapped
to Iran by the Iraqi Kurdistan Islamic movement. After seven years it has
revealed that after being tortured they were executed by the regime, despite
the fact that the regime has not given their bodies to the family of victims.
In the Iranian Kurdistan all political
parties’ activity is prohibited. The regime of the Islamic Republic has
forbidden all political parties in Kurdistan. The members of Kurdish parties
are according to 197-202 paragraphs of the punishment law classified as
evils.
The activity of NGOs is highly controlled.
The regime of Iran considers all NGOs contact to
international organisations and other
counties missions in Iran as spying and acting against the security of
country.
In Iran the studying Kurdish language
in schools is still prohibited. The economy of Kurdish area is collapsed
and the unemployment rate in Kurdistan is estimated to be 47% of its work
force. The Islamic republic of Iran distributes drugs systematically
within Kurdish youth in order to
make them passive member of the society. Being shot by regimes gun men
has become an every day event in Kurdistan.
We therefore appeal international
community and the participants of the conference to send a human rights
delegate to visit Iranian Kurdistan to witness the real life of Kurdish
people in Iran.
|
